


NEW DAY ON THE CLYDE EDITH CURRAN

THE NATION

MAY 29, 1972

50 cents



**California Primary
The Candidates
Discover the People**
Mary Ellen Leary

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE ALIENATED?
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy

**Nixon in Moscow
The Diplomacy of
Unpredictability**
Robert E. Hunter

•
Leo P. Ribuffo / The Long Cold War

LETTERS

interned

Philadelphia, Pa.

DEAR SIR: While in agreement with many of Andrew Boyd's statements regarding Northern Ireland ["The End of Stormont," *The Nation*, May 1], I take issue with one of them, namely, "When Faulkner seized and interned more than 300 Republicans and their supporters. . . ."

These men have never had the opportunity to prove or disprove whether or not they were Republicans, likewise their "supporters." This is the crux of the situation. Reliable sources have indicated that many of these men were not connected with the Republican movement and were interned on intelligence reports supplied from the RUC and the Special Branch. That the policy of internment was indiscriminate, witness the interning of even a blind man, Peter Fallon.

We are well aware of your magazine's stand on the Northern Ireland situation and your past history on the stand against the Black and Tans, and congratulate you for it. While we do not wish to appear to be nit-picking Mr. Boyd's article, the point in question is the primary cause of the violence.

William J. Brennan
The United Irish-American Societies
of Delaware Valley, Pa.

Muruba Atoll

West Vancouver, B.C.

DEAR SIR: France is planning to commit another criminal act of environmental anarchy by detonating a hydrogen bomb in the atmosphere over Muruba Atoll in the South Pacific "some time in June."

The Greenpeace Foundation, which was formed to create a global focal point for the protest of all peoples against these crimes, is now organizing an international campaign to stop this test before it is too far ahead in planning. . . .

We urge all citizens of all countries to help individually to create a wave of 10 million letters of protest to Georges Pompidou, President of France. To insure that the true flow of letters becomes known, we ask writers to address their letters to the French President in care of their own country's embassy in Paris.

We invite everyone traveling in France at the end of May this year to join the Greenpeace Family at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in order to take our protests into the streets of that city. . . .

We ask all travelers in Stockholm on June 5-16 to demonstrate at the First United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to be held in that city at the time. . . .

Meanwhile, *Greenpeace III*, a 38-foot ketch, manned by dedicated environmentalists, sailed April 27 from Auckland, N.Z., on a voyage of protest into the test area to claim that space rightfully as the human environment.

Greenpeace, which has become worldwide in its membership since its strenuous, but unsuccessful, protest against the tests conducted in the Aleutians by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States last fall, now has a global capability that grows stronger every day and promises to continue to escalate the people's protest against nuclear testing by any nation, anywhere.

Bill Darnell, Member of the Board

correction

In "At Long Last," our editorial of April 24 on an action brought by the ACLU to enjoin further expenditures for the war in Vietnam, *The Nation* mentioned William L. Standard as being one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs. In fact, the lawyer in question is Mr. Standard's son, Michael B. Standard.

The Editors

EDITORIALS

CAMPAIGN '72

Wallace, Rockefeller, Connally

Along with Governor Wallace himself, many of us have harbored premonitions that he might some day be the victim of an assassin's bullet; the parallel with Huey Long could not be ignored. Fortunately, Wallace survived the attack, but his candidacy must now be viewed in a new light. Running for the Presidency is an arduous business. Franklin D. Roosevelt managed it despite his handicap, but it is difficult to imagine Wallace campaigning from a hospital bed or wheelchair. Even assuming—as I certainly hope—that his recovery will be complete and swift, it would seem unlikely that he can be an active candidate between now and November. As was expected, he did well in Michigan and Maryland, but these primaries were in large measure untypical, for a variety of reasons, and Wallace has probably achieved his maximum delegate strength.

He will be a factor at the convention, but what kind of bargain can he strike? He could swing his support to Humphrey in exchange for the Vice Presidential nomination. Scruple on the Senator's part would not rule out such an alliance. After all, he embraced Lester Maddox in 1967, is "flexible" on every issue, and would not let a matter of principle stand in the way of a second chance at the Presidency. One practical consideration might deter him: the danger of alienating the support which he continues to enjoy from many blacks and leaders of organized labor. Nor is Wallace likely to run as a third party candidate, whatever ideas he may have had before the shooting. If he does not run as an independent, the true believers in his constituency will probably vote for Nixon, but there is a good chance that the Populists who have been misguided into this constituency can be won by McGovern, should he be the Democratic nominee.

And McGovern's prospects are improving. The most significant result in Michigan was the fact that he topped Humphrey, who enjoyed several apparent advantages, including the support of organized labor. But Michigan disclosed the sizable rift between the leadership of organized labor and the rank and file. It also demonstrated how Meany's stand on Vietnam handicaps labor by making it possible for an emotional issue, or pseudo-issue, such as bussing, to be blown up out of all relation to its intrinsic interest or importance. "Anti-bussing" sentiment reflects discontent, and that stems in large part from the social, economic and psychological consequences of the war.

* * *

Governor Rockefeller has been going down hill politically since his shameful alliance with the conservatives and his gentle ditching of Charles Goodell. For all his experience, he kept dreaming of the Vice Presidency or a top Cabinet position. But once it became evident that these were indeed dreams, the Governor began to act in a manner which, if it does not restore his reputation, at least polishes it a bit. His veto of the bill to repeal New York's liberal abortion law, despite the President's bizarre inter-

vention, was a wise and courageous act. His veto of a bill placing a temporary ban on so-called "forced racial bussing," was a sensible decision that also runs counter to Nixon's politics. So too was his veto of a measure that would have killed the controversial low-income housing project in Forest Hills. The Governor made some tart comments about "inordinate pressures" at this session of the legislature. "Shocking evidence," he called it, of minorities seeking to impose their will on the majority through personal attacks and threats of political retaliation in an election year. Of the measure to repeal the abortion law he said: "I can see no justification now for repealing this reform and thus condemning hundreds of thousands of women to the dark ages again. . . . I do not believe it right for one group to impose its vision of morality on an entire society. Neither is it just or practical for the state to attempt to dictate the innermost personal beliefs and conduct of its citizens." Incidentally a recent WCBS-TV poll indicates that residents of New York support the liberalized abortion measure in a 62-to-31 ratio. The support includes 67 per cent of the Protestants, 91 per cent of the Jews, and 45 per cent of the Catholics. The break between Rockefeller and Nixon on these three issues indicates that the President, in New York at least, has abandoned the idea of broadening his constituency and is trying instead to hold the diehard elements who support his stand on the war and related matters.

* * *

In leaving the Treasury John Connally has taunted the press and official Washington to "correctly interpret" his departure. Word of his leaving first came from Texas, and that suggests that he intends to return there, to shore up, if he can, the Johnson-Connally dynasty which is in trouble at the moment. The stakes are enormous. The idea that Ralph Yarborough might return to the Senate must irritate the dynasty, and the thought that Texas will send an uncommitted delegation to the Democratic convention must be equally obnoxious. As Secretary of the Treasury, Connally could not assume personal command in Texas; his presence there is essential. Like most of his fat-cat backers, Connally is a "local Democrat" and "national Republican." The dynasty must keep its feet, so to speak, in both parties.

It would be difficult for Nixon to dump Agnew who, Senator Goldwater assures us, is more popular with the Republican rank and file than is the President. But it could be done. First, though, an effort might be made to checkmate McGovern at Miami. With Humphrey nominated, the dynasty could relax. If McGovern is named, then a "Texas Democrats for Nixon Committee" could be set up. Connally assures us that he is not going to withdraw from the human race. We interpret that to mean that he is not withdrawing from the race, period. He wants to be President—somehow, anyhow. As a Republican, if need be, or if the odds seem favorable. As Nixon's running mate, or as his handpicked successor, or as the man who might assume command of the party between now and 1976—or, possibly, as the man who, at the stroke of midnight, concluded an agreement with the North Vietnamese in Paris. It doesn't matter. But essential to his ambition is the maintenance of that all-important power base in Texas.

CAREY MCWILLIAMS

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THE NATION

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No. 22

Congress and the War

H. R. 976, filed on May 10, calls for the impeachment of the President. It is sponsored by Representatives Conyers, Abzug, Dellums, Chisholm and Ryan, and has, of course, not the slightest chance of passage. To get at the political meaning of this measure, however, it must be considered in context. A far larger number of Representatives would like to vote for it—if it ever came to a vote—than would allow themselves to be put on record in its favor. This points to a mood of frustration on the part of many members of both Houses; it was well expressed in a speech by Donald Riegle (R., Mich.) on May 9.

Mr. Riegle has been a member of the House for five and a half years. When he was elected in 1966, about 5,000 Americans had been killed in Vietnam. Now the figure stands at about 55,000. Mr. Riegle has been a persistent critic of the war and of Mr. Nixon's policies in Indochina. He is frustrated because, among other things, the House has never staged a full-dress debate on the undeclared war in Vietnam. To understand how that can be possible, on a matter so momentous and extending over so long a time, one must understand how the House legislates. The order of business, and the time allotted to each item, is strictly controlled. The normal procedure is for bills to be reported out by committees, which put the measures on line for consideration. Then, before they can come to the floor of the House for full debate, they must receive a rule from the Committee on Rules. Given such a rule, the House sits as a Committee of the Whole and debate can proceed.

The irony of Mr. Riegle's legislative impotence is that he is a member of the Committee on Appropriations. One would think that from this springboard, he could open debate on the Indochina issue by arguing about the budget allocated to the war. But that has been no help, since no one has been able to learn what is the Indochinese fraction of the total defense budget, even from the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. In the fiscal 1972 budget it might be \$8 billion, but that is only a guess which, for debate, is insufficient.

There are some small chinks in the armor of control whereby the ordinary members of the House are kept from insurrection. At the opening of each day's session, members may get up and make one-minute speeches. One cannot say much in a few breaths, so that is a trivial measure of permissiveness. However, there is also a somewhat larger opening for the restless. "Previous orders" are issued fairly freely. They entitle a member to speak for a half hour or an hour at the end of the day, after most members of the House and of the press have departed. The member so favored may address a nearly empty chamber and, except by a stroke of luck, be assured of no attention in the news media.

Faute de mieux, Mr. Riegle took advantage of that opportunity, and here is what he said: "We have been at war now for ten years. And 55,000 of our best young Americans are dead. Still we have not faced this question, and we do not face it today . . . we have never had an opportunity in the House to vote yes or no on just that part of the defense appropriation that would be allocated to the war in Vietnam. I would submit . . . the reason that is so

is because there has been an effort within the House, and I think bipartisan in nature, to keep the Vietnam issue . . . hidden in the defense appropriation and force members of this House to take the untenable position of voting against the entire defense appropriation, if they oppose the war in Vietnam, or else of being forced to vote for the entire appropriation, which means, of course, supporting that which is going to be allocated to Vietnam."

Of course Congress has debated aspects of the war not once but on many occasions, but Mr. Riegle's point is that it has done so tangentially or peripherally or by restricted debate on an amendment to a pending bill or by debating some point of procedure. Currently, for example, the Senate set out boldly to cut off all funds for American hostilities in Indochina four months after agreement was reached on release of American prisoners. But this effort was promptly frustrated, at least for the time being, by an amendment which would make the action turn on a cease-fire as well as the release of prisoners of war. The effect was to bring the resolution in line with the President's latest proposals and thereby to defer action until after the Moscow summit.

The impeachment resolution is a reaction, in part, of frustrated Representatives to this state of affairs. Regardless of its merits as a peace tactic, in a year in which the President is up for re-election, its significance is obvious. If the impeachment resolution came to a vote, the tally would be one-sided, and the President would seize on it as proof that Congress and the country were behind him. But the resolution is not likely to come up for a vote soon and if the Judiciary Committee could be induced to hold hearings on it, opponents of the war would have an excellent forum in which to make their views known. In any case, Congressional submission has about reached its limits, if Congress is to exist as an independent and effective body. What is most disturbing about the President's latest venture in brinkmanship is that he did not see fit to consult in advance with Congressional leaders, much less seek Congressional consent.

And Congress is not the only body which has the power to curb these insatiable encroachments. As Rep. Abner Mikva (D., Ill.) said on May 9: "Ultimately of course the only way to end this war once and for all is to defeat the President who is continuing and escalating it. The policies of this President—like the policies of his predecessor—must be repudiated by the people in November. That power of the vote is direct and absolute, and it represents the last clear chance to end this war and save this country."

Journey for a Fig Leaf

His aides assure us that the President's May 9th address was his very own handiwork—the assurances were really not necessary, for the address is laden with his familiar self-congratulatory passages. It is pertinent to inquire, therefore, just what *did* he mean? What was he trying to suggest or signal? His deliberately ambiguous offer gives first priority to the release of the POWs. He would then agree to an internationally supervised cease-fire. These steps taken, he would put a stop to all acts of force throughout Indochina and withdraw from Vietnam—not from all of Indochina—in four months.

Mr. Nixon can hardly be serious about the internationally supervised cease-fire. Who would provide the force and what reason is there to believe that the North Vietnamese would accept more "foreign troops" on Vietnamese soil, particularly after their unfortunate experience in 1954 in the wake of the Geneva Conference? But Nixon did not say or suggest that the North Vietnamese would have to withdraw from present positions or from those they might hold when a cease-fire was proclaimed. Since the preliminary steps would presumably take some time, the four months within which all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam might extend beyond November. But the POWs would be released before then and could be welcomed home in a timely, nonpartisan parade.

There is no mention in the address of Vietnamization. Again and again the President refers to the people of South Vietnam but not to the Saigon regime per se. A political settlement would be reached "between the Vietnamese themselves." It is almost as though the President were hinting that he would be willing to connive at an eventual—if discreetly timed—take-over by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. As an assurance that this did not happen too soon, U.S. troops would remain for the four-month period; after that we would still have strong air and naval forces in the area. A great deal is made of the need to protect the 60,000 troops still in Vietnam, but it is difficult to believe that the President really fears a Dunkirk. As long as we have a sizable force there he can—as he sees it—rely on his powers as Commander in Chief, regardless of what Congress may or may not do.

So now he journeys to Moscow under less than brilliant circumstances, but no doubt with a tacit understanding that the mining of Haiphong will not preclude an agreement on strategic arms limitation, the Germany treaties, joint space explorations, and some large-scale trade deals. Since the Soviets lack naval power in the Western Pacific, nothing much is likely to happen at Haiphong while the talks are under way and agreement on significant issues is possible. And it is possible, given the collapse of "Vietnamization," that some kind of military agreement might be negotiated on the basis of a divided Vietnam, the North Vietnamese being permitted to hold what their military action has won. This in turn implies that eventually they would prevail. But long before that happens, how is the President to justify the loss of life and treasure suffered by prolonging the war?

Fig leaf seems the most apt metaphor for what the President desperately seeks—a cover for the defeat of his policy in Vietnam. To Stewart Alsop he seeks only a "translucent fig leaf" to cover "a total American withdrawal from Indochina"—actually he speaks only of withdrawal from Vietnam—while to Joseph Kraft the best the President can now get in return for the risks he has run is the fig leaf for defeat which he could have had all along. Perhaps even now the Soviets can induce the North Vietnamese to give him a cover of some kind for a military settlement of the sort he *seems* to be proposing. But it is by no means clear that the Russians—even assuming their willingness—could exert that much influence on the North Vietnamese. So for the moment at least what we have is a President en route to Moscow in search of a fig leaf.

Labor and the War

A group of twenty-two prominent labor leaders from thirteen unions are planning to set up an organization, Labor for Peace, with the aim of ending the war in Vietnam. The members include Emil Mazey, secretary general of the United Automobile Workers; Frank Rosenblum, secretary-treasurer of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; Harold Gibbons, a vice president of the Teamsters; Louis Goldblatt, secretary-treasurer of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union; Leon Davis, president of Local 1199 of the Hospital Workers, and others of like prominence. They have scheduled a meeting for June 23-24 in St. Louis.

The Nation regards this as a matter of major importance. It is an outgrowth of a mission to Hanoi by Gibbons, David Livingston, secretary-treasurer of the Distributive Workers of America, and Clifton Caldwell, a vice president of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters. [See "Labor Mission to Hanoi," *The Nation*, April 24.] Some of the people involved in the present movement helped organize the Labor Peace Assembly of 1967 in Chicago [see "Labor Meets for Peace" by B. J. Widick, *The Nation*, November 27, 1967], but at that time they acted as individuals; now most of them are acting for and in the name of their respective unions, with a combined membership of some 4 million—a significant section of the American labor movement.

The idea is not to form an organization to work for peace candidates per se. Such an approach might embarrass unions that have made commitments to Muskie, as some did, or to Humphrey. It would also look like an attempt to usurp the political function of the AFL-CIO, or at least getting in its way. What the new organization intends is to raise the issue of peace to the highest possible priority by November, and to set up a permanent, ongoing organization to this end. As of now, this would involve working against President Nixon's re-election.

In more detail, the general objectives to which labor should be committed are outlined by Felix Rodriguez, political editor of California Labor News Service, in an open letter to President George Meany and members of the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO. Rodriguez believes that further American involvement in Indochina (such as has occurred since his letter was published in the April 24th issue of *Organized Labor*) may lead to an incident touching off nuclear devastation. He contends further that the war and military spending "are to blame for the economic gaps, inflation, unemployment . . . and the most critical division within American society since the Civil War. . . . It is pointless for consumers to complain about high prices, for workers to complain about frozen wages, for property owners to complain about high taxes, while this nation continues to wage a war nobody wants."

George Meany, and the council he dominates, have given unstinting support to the cold war from its inception, and to the Vietnamese War; without that support the latter would probably have come to an end long ago. The role of labor is pivotal; the appeal to Meany could not be more timely. He is against Nixon on economic grounds, but he supports him in his warlike foreign policy. That is political schizophrenia. The only way to end it is to withdraw

labor's support of the Administration's war policies.

We face a national emergency and there may be worse to come: Meany and the other top labor leaders should not forget that for a second. The St. Louis meeting could not be better timed. The current developments in Vietnam give Meany and the AFL-CIO council an opportunity to reverse a disastrous policy and to win strong support of the rank and file for their "oust Nixon" political directives. It is difficult to conceive of a greater service both to organized labor and the country.

'A Rat Race Is for Rats'

In this issue (p. 685) Edith Curran describes an important event that has received scant notice in the United States—the take-over of the Scottish Clydeside shipyards by the workers, in what they call a "work-in." By failing to reinvest for modernization in what was once the greatest shipbuilding industry in the world, the owners allowed the yards to sink into obsolescence. In an effort to save the industry and their jobs, the workers took militant action some six months ago, with remarkable success. They are still in charge.

One of their leaders, Jimmy Reid, is not only spokesman for the shop stewards and a Communist councillor but also Rector of Glasgow University, an honorary office held in times past by Edmund Burke, Adam Smith, Macaulay, Peel, Palmerston, Gladstone, Disraeli and others of like stature. The Rector is elected yearly by the students and his sole duty is to deliver an address. This year Jimmy Reid—or "James Reid, Esq.," as the announcements read—spoke on "Alienation"; his address, as reported in *The Manchester Guardian* of May 6 is a humdinger.

"Alienation," he said, "is the cry of men who feel themselves to be the victims of blind economic forces beyond their control . . . the frustrations of ordinary people excluded from the processes of decision making." This lack of fulfillment, he explained, is a cause of "criminal anti-social behavior," so-called maladjustment, young people dropping out of school or society, turning to alcohol and drugs, becoming "loners," etc. Not the sole cause, alienation is a factor greater than is generally realized.

Nor is it only the victims who are alienated. The beneficiaries, a much smaller group, are often as estranged as

the victims. Reid begged his audience not to hate these people; they too are products of the society. He urged the Glasgow students to reject all that distorts and devalues human relations. "As an illustration of this distortion, I offer the acceptance of both the concept and the term 'the rat race.' The picture it conjures up is of people scurrying around, scrambling for position, trampling on others, back-stabbing—and all in pursuit of personal success. To the students I address this appeal: reject these attitudes. A rat race is for rats. We're not rats. We're human beings. Reject the insidious pressures in society that would blunt your critical faculties to all that is happening around you, that would caution silence in the face of injustice, lest you jeopardize your chances of promotion and self-advancement. This is how it starts and before you know where you are, you're a fully paid-up member of the rat pack. The price is too high. It entails the loss of your dignity and human spirit."

The rat race and its concomitants are the consequences of profit as the sole criterion of economic activity. In a decent society the objective would not be individual or corporate profit but service to society, to the people as a whole. A society such as ours (everything Reid said applies with even greater force to the United States) cannot sort out and establish a humane order of priorities. Reid did not minimize the transformations that the conquest of alienation calls for. Social progress is not to be measured solely by material advance. "Our aim," he said, "must be the enrichment of the whole quality of life. . . . a spiritual transformation of our country . . . the restructuring of the institutions of government where necessary, and the evolution of additional structures so as to involve people in the decision-making process." The aim of education should be to equip and educate people for life, not solely for work or a profession. Surprisingly he inveighed against "permissiveness," but it turned out that he had in mind something altogether different from the American meaning. Any society, he said, "which allows over a million people to be unemployed is far too permissive for my liking."

When Reid had finished, the audience stood and cheered him for a full minute. The press, which is by tradition neutral, joined in the ovation. Why should the British be ahead of us? There must be Jimmy Reids in the work force here.

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE ALIENATED?

SEN. EDWARD M. KENNEDY

Washington

No person, no government, no organization that believes in popular democracy can fail to sense how cruelly the pride and spirit of America have been hobbled by the frustrations of our society. Now, at a time when the awful shadow of tragedy has once again passed over the American political landscape, when the name of Laurel, Md. has been seared into the American conscience along with

the names of so many other places marking so many other senseless tragedies in recent years, we owe it to ourselves and our country to try to understand the deep and bitter feelings that divide our people.

The overriding sign of our frustrations may be Vietnam, but it is not the only symptom of the alienation and discontent that run so deep today. Wherever I travel, I find that average citizens—poor or middle class or rich; white or black or brown; city or farm or suburb—have a profound dissatisfaction with the way they live, and a deep and cynical despair that things will ever change.

You have to go back to the early 1930s to find a period when dissatisfaction was so prevalent in the nation. But the ominous new factor in the psychology we find today is the feeling that nothing can be done about it. In the early Roosevelt days, people believed in the capacity of government and its leaders. Their faith was vindicated in countless ways, through programs like Social Security, the minimum wage and the protection of the rights of labor.

Today, however, our failures seem much more overwhelming. The despair is more intense, because we have lost the sense of confidence and inspiration that leaders in other times of crisis were able to instill. It is not my purpose here to indict any administration or to condemn any political party. Today's distrust of government and the burden of dissatisfaction and despair are felt by Republicans and Democrats and independents alike. The blame is there for all to share.


On countless issues, of absolutely vital importance to the people—issues like homes and health and food and schools—we find a similar serious breakdown in our ability to deal effectively with the problems that the modern world presents. This year of 1972 is shadowed by a sense of dissatisfaction, even despair, that we cannot ignore if we ever hope to govern our country, and turn it back to the path of decency and justice once again.

The investigation of Mr. Kleindienst and ITT is but the latest dimension in the pervasive pattern of alienation and despair. The hearings before our Senate Judiciary Committee demonstrate, beyond any doubt at all, that Wall Street is the length and breadth of the Administration's policy, that the doors of government today are open wide to the chairman of the board, but bolted tight to every ordinary citizen who tries to enter. We know who speaks for ITT today, but who will speak for all the rest who have goals and needs and dreams that are every bit as deserving as those of the nation's largest corporations?

Consider the man we are told is the typical dissatisfied voter: slightly older than 30, a blue-collar worker, living in a big city or one of its near suburbs, married, with a family—perhaps, in the language of today, an "ethnic," a second- or third-generation American. Because this man is now 30 or more, he was probably wholly bypassed by the educational revolution in the decade of the sixties and before. So when you talk to him about discrimination in education, he thinks not of blacks or Puerto Ricans but of himself. He thinks of his own children, whose schools are often no better than the ghetto schools whose condition we all deplore. And so the resentment builds, as he himself and his family endure deprivations and denials of opportunity that no one ever mentions.

He faces the future, this young man, with twenty or thirty years of working life ahead of him—years in which the educational requirements for economic and social advancement will leave him far behind—twenty or thirty years to go to the plant, to watch television at home; twenty or thirty years of "day that follows day, with death the only goal."

And what days they are. How many of us have ever been down in the mines, where men become permanently stooped from working in tunnels 5 feet high, where their lungs fill up and turn black with deadly coal dust, and



The Special (Brussels)

every minute of every day they wait for the killing cave-in?

How many of us have ever walked in a steel mill, on top of the coke ovens, or on a construction site where the asbestos is being sprayed to protect our office buildings from fire, but where one of every two men who work with it will eventually die of cancer?

How many of us have ever been to an automobile plant? The assembly line is moving at the rate of one car every thirty-six seconds. It does not stop, that line, for coffee or a cigarette, not for a stomach cramp or a word with your neighbor. It moves mechanically forward, the correct engine dropping into the correct frame, to be enclosed by the correct body style in the correct color, all commanded by computer.

If your job can be done in the time the line moves within the reach of your hands, then you can stand in place as you work. If it cannot—if it takes more than thirty-six seconds to complete—then you move with the line, running as you work. And then you run to catch the next car in line, and attach yourself to it in time to repeat the dreary process once again.

For millions of our citizens, these images are very real. But how far removed they seem from the hearing rooms of Congress or the conscience of the nation.

We are all Americans, but we live in different worlds. Few of us have ever heard of Lordstown, where young Ohio auto workers went on strike against the cleanest, most modern automobile plant in America. They were protesting the inhuman efficiency of their work. Fewer of us can understand how, at the Eldon Axle plant in Detroit, a worker went berserk and shot three foremen. His defense was insanity, brought on by working in the incredible noise

and filth and danger of that plant. The judge and jury visited the plant. The verdict was unanimous for acquittal.

And what about the Sunshine Silver Mine in Kellogg, Ida.? Ninety-one men are dead today, after one of the worst disasters in the history of the Western United States. Hundreds of wives and children and brothers and sisters are bereaved after a long and hopeless vigil at the mine. And all because of a fire thousands of feet below the ground that never should have happened. Would you believe that just six months ago, thirty safety violations were found at that mine? Would you believe that new employees were never shown the escape routes? Would you believe they never had a fire drill?

Nor does the situation seem to change with time. Hundreds died and thousands were left homeless in the flood at Buffalo Creek, W.Va., this winter when a coal company's unsafe slag heap gave way. We are no more conscious of the tragedy or of its cause than we are of the Johnstown flood of 1889, which was caused by the breaking of a similar dam in Pennsylvania, used to create a lake for a millionaires' hunting and fishing club.

Here, I think, as in so many other areas, we have to point the finger of blame most clearly toward ourselves. We have to recognize how often the working man has been failed by his government, failed by the Democratic Party, failed by his employer, failed by his labor union, failed by his country. It does not have to be this way. The potential agenda for hope is almost infinite. Let me suggest just a few of the principles that ought to guide our actions.

First, and perhaps most urgently, we must introduce some fundamental fairness in our national economic policy. Obviously, this means a much more evenhanded application of price and wage restraints. We cannot tolerate a policy that allows a freer rein for rising prices than it does for rising wages.

It also means, among other changes, tax reforms, so that individuals and corporations pay their fair share of federal taxes. To paraphrase a famous aphorism, our tax laws, in their majestic equality, allow the rich as well as the poor to invest in state and local bonds, to enjoy long-term capital gains, to drill for oil, and to do all the other things that our revenue laws encourage. And yet the Administration stands astride the Revenue Code, forbidding all efforts toward reform, opposing any decent welfare program for the poor, defending to the death the extravagant welfare the tax laws give the rich.

Second, fairness requires that we deal realistically with the problem of unemployment. We need specific programs to create jobs for all who want them. We have seen enough in recent months, I think, to denounce once and for all the discredited economic theory that if government takes care of business, business will take care of labor. Week after week come fresh reports of the fantastic success of our current policies in revitalizing corporate profits, and month after month come fresh reports of the same dismal level of unemployment at 6 per cent. The Dow Jones is likely to assault 1,000, they say, but what about the assault we need against unemployment?

As recent studies show, literally millions of jobs can and should be filled, and filled now, in areas of vital

national need like health and education, food and housing, transportation and pollution. It makes no sense—it is fundamentally unfair—to let these jobs go undone, while millions of people are unemployed. A program to put people to work, and to meet those urgent needs, must be an immediate high priority of our domestic policy.

Third, we must pledge to introduce some fairness and decency into the conditions of working life. Every year, more than 15,000 Americans are killed outright on their jobs—an annual toll far higher than the U.S. losses in the war in Vietnam. Every year, 9 million more are injured, and the additional toll from latent diseases like cancer or heart or lung conditions may well be even larger. At a minimum, we must oppose the killing inside American factories as fervently and strenuously as we have opposed the killing in Vietnam.

Congress passed in 1970 laws to protect the health and safety of workers on the job, but those laws have never been adequately enforced. The killing inside goes on, because this Administration, with its double standard of justice, cares more about preserving the dividends of ITT than it does about preserving the lives of American workers. Let Spiro Agnew explain that kind of law and order this year.

But fairness and decency for American workers mean more than simply keeping them alive and safe from injury or disease. It means an effort to make it possible for workers to live—not as machines but as men and women who are human beings.

All over the industrial world—in Germany and Sweden, in Italy and Yugoslavia—government and industry are experimenting with ways to give workers greater participation in the direction of their jobs, to relieve the deadening boredom of their work, and to use and reward the skills of their heads and hands.

In the United States, by contrast, our efforts are mostly in the wrong direction. Through the investment credit, accelerated depreciation and other devices, the government pays industry enormous subsidies to replace workers with machines. They throw good men out of work, and the work that remains becomes even more monotonous and routine. Admittedly, making the assembly line more human and more humane is a large and difficult task. But it is at the heart of anything we mean by social justice.

Fourth, we must continue to advance the cause of racial justice. Those who cast their votes for prejudice today are frightened and resentful. They fear the crime that fills their streets. They fear the disruption in their children's schools. They fear the random violence that has done so much to poison all our lives. But they also know, as we know, that true leadership must give true hope to all Americans, black and white alike. It must offer all the people a full share in American life. They know that only this sort of leadership can fulfill a promise to heal our wounds and bring us back together.

The greatest coalition America ever had was built on the common interest of the poor and black, the farmer and the working man. Today, as then, we have far more in common than divides us. So long as we work to carry out that legacy, the forces that would divide us cannot prevail.

The fifth and final principle we must follow is one that

brings me back to the issue of the war. As men and women who believe in action for the benefit of all the people, not just for the few who share our own particular view, we must admit how blind we have been to many of our citizens on the issue of the war.

More than 2 million young Americans, predominantly the children of the poor and the working class, went off to fight the war when they were called. We know that hundreds of thousands of others were able to watch the war from the sanctuary of their college deferment. And we know that tens of thousands more went underground or to Canada instead. Today, in the interest of reconciliation, we have begun a vigorous national debate over the question of amnesty for those who said they would not go. My view is clear, that America cannot turn its back on those who responded to the call of conscience, who were right about the war at a time when most of the political leaders of the day were wrong.

But those who went and served might as well not exist at all. Almost no attention is paid to the millions who fought for the interests of the nation, as those interests were defined by the policies of our government and its elected representatives.

What did they find when they came back home? They found an inadequate GI Bill of Rights. They found no jobs. They found wretchedly bad hospitals. They found no serious effort to help them escape the drug addiction so many of them acquired in Vietnam. The list of deprivation is almost endless.

The result was a fundamental sense of injustice, a distrust of government and all its institutions—above all a deep distrust of those who are supposed to stand for progressive action, because these veterans see no progress for themselves in the programs we propose.

We find among these men and women an enormous sense of discontent, widespread and running deep, a sense that their struggles and their sacrifices have been forgotten. And so, if we would reach the millions of citizens who are alienated, we must also urge the claims of those who honorably served a cause whose dishonor was not of their making.

In the principles I have discussed, I have not tried to propose a complete program to achieve justice in America, nor is there one. But if there is one lesson we have learned in these last painful, terrible years, it is that the quality of justice is indivisible—that we will have it for all of us, or it will survive for none.

And so, in this election year, the stakes are very high—they are a young child boarding a bus to find a better education, an automobile worker thinking of his family as he sweats on the assembly line, a young American lying in a Veterans hospital and another waiting to come home from Canada, while others at this very moment are engaged in the day's battle, halfway round the world. In this most critical year, we work for all of them. And thus we work, most truly, for ourselves and for the best possibilities of our democratic future. □

NIXON IN MOSCOW

The Diplomacy of Unpredictability

ROBERT E. HUNTER

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Most Americans are perhaps puzzled that President Nixon has laid so much emphasis on the role the Soviet Union has been playing in the current North Vietnamese offensive. To be sure, large quantities of Soviet heavy equipment have been showing up on the battlefield; but Moscow has been for many years the major supplier of war materiel to Hanoi. Why, then, the sudden and repeated indictment of Soviet actions?

There are several possible answers: the President is concerned about what would happen in South Vietnam after a military defeat; and he wants to keep Vietnam out of the November elections. But he is also concerned about something else that most people overlook. That is his overall view of the world, and particularly of Soviet-American relations during the next few years. Since these matters of high strategy play a major role in the President's thinking, we cannot ignore them.

To begin with, it seems clear that the President's foreign policy, in general, is dominated by what he sees as two central problems: first, that the Russians have now reached a state of parity with us in the nuclear arms race; and second that the American people, along with the Congress, are more opposed to the idea of our fighting anywhere in the world, much less in Vietnam. In the President's view, strategic parity will neutralize any opportunity the United States has had to "face down" the Russians by dint of our long-enjoyed nuclear superiority; and the erosion of what is called "American will" could encourage the Russians to turn parity into a positive instrument for advancing their power and position in the world at the expense of ours and that of our allies. Thus, on April 26, the President told the nation—in the key point of his whole speech on Vietnam:

If one country, armed with the most modern weapons by major powers can invade another nation and succeed in conquering it, other countries will be encouraged to do the same thing—in the Mideast, in Europe, and in other international danger spots.

As the President sees it, therefore, the test in Vietnam is about issues that go far beyond the fate of Indochina,

or even the elusive factor called "American honor." It is also about the future of Soviet-American relations in a world where we no longer hold the balance of strategic nuclear power. Nor is this an isolated instance of his ideas in this area. During the invasion of Cambodia, the President made a positive declaration that failure in Indochina would provoke crises elsewhere—again, in the Middle East and Europe. And much the same notion emerged during the crisis on the Indian subcontinent last year. As President Nixon later explained in his State of the World message, we had to prevent what the Administration believed were Indian designs (with Soviet backing) to dismember West Pakistan:

Acquiescence had ominous implications for the survival of Pakistan, for the stability of many other countries in the world, and for relations among the great powers. . . . It would be dangerous to world peace if our efforts to promote a détente between the superpowers were interpreted as an opportunity for the strategic expansion of Soviet power. If we had failed to take a stand, such an interpretation could only have been encouraged, and the genuine relaxation of tensions we have been seeking could have been jeopardized.

What the Administration did in South Asia, and what it is doing in Vietnam, are thus tied together by the need it feels to keep the Soviet Union from expanding its power during a time of change in the nuclear arms race. Nor is it an idle matter. Like it or not, there is some connection between the state of play in the nuclear arms race and the way the superpowers behave in their overall relations with each other. Of course, skeptics will immediately raise an objection: since both superpowers long ago insured that a strategic nuclear war would be mutual suicide, and since all we are doing now is manipulating levels of overkill, relative superiority in weaponry means next to nothing in strategic terms. That is certainly true, but it overlooks the fact that the United States did permit the relative number of nuclear missiles on each side to become psychologically important, as one way of showing that we were in general "superior" to the Soviet Union. And because it was convenient for us to do that during the 1960s, we never got round to proclaiming that the nuclear arms race had reached a political stalemate to match the strategic stalemate that emerged as soon as both Russia and America learned they could destroy each other, come what may.

Today, therefore, the Administration is concerned that the Soviet Union will try to play this psychological game itself,* and even take new risks, at a time when it is no longer at a strategic disadvantage. Thus it is no wonder that the President is so concerned about Soviet actions in Asia, however limited. That is especially so when the American people generally want to reduce all U.S. commitments abroad, when Senator Mansfield is gaining support for his attempt to cut U.S. troops in Europe, and when Senator McGovern is promising a \$32 billion cut in the defense budget if he is elected President. Indeed, this

*Of course, the Russians are still at a vast disadvantage when the number of deliverable warheads is counted—5,700 U.S. warheads vs. 2,500 Soviet warheads by mid-1972. Yet since we always played the psychological game in terms of the number of missile launchers, the Russians now appear to be ahead—and in this kind of politics appearances are everything.

popular attitude actually increases the need the President obviously feels to make the most of the weapons and positions we do have, in order to convince the Russians that they cannot gain any advantages. Ironically, the peace movement in the United States has strengthened the resolve of Administration planners who see the psychological relationship with the Soviet Union to be the key-stone of the President's "full generation of peace." American "will" must be demonstrated, even if the actions we take in Vietnam are far out of proportion to anything we any longer have at stake *in Southeast Asia itself*.

For the same reasons, President Nixon goes to great lengths to demonstrate what is consciously proclaimed as his "unpredictability." This tactic came out of strategic theory in the 1950s; it means simply that, by occasionally overreacting to provocation, the Administration can prevent the Russians from calculating where we might respond to their "incursions" and where we might not. They must then be more cautious. In addition, the President's ability to carry off the invasion of Cambodia, the nuclear test at Amchitka, and building the ABM showed that he could override U.S. public opinion when an important issue was at stake (as the Administration sees it) in the U.S.-Soviet psychological game. Again, according to this logic, public opposition to these acts itself requires the President to pursue them so relentlessly, in order to prove to the Russians that he is in control and *could at some point in the future* act to counter Soviet advances.

Whatever the reader may think of this analysis so far, he must face the fact that it is typical of the arguments presented within the upper echelons of the government today, and that it strongly motivates the President's policy on Vietnam. Unfortunately, these issues are rarely debated in public, especially since Dr. Kissinger, the chief architect of the President's global strategy, is carefully sheltered from public testimony before Congress by the doctrine of "executive privilege." Yet because of the tremendous concentration of foreign policy decision making within the White House, the protection of even a few officials from public questioning denies a full-scale debate on the factors that actually motivate Administration policy, rather than on just the shadows that gather about local situations existing in Vietnam, in South Asia, or elsewhere.

Even without access to the inner sanctums of the White House, however, it is possible to see a number of flaws in the President's approach. Two are most evident. First, the Administration is almost certainly exaggerating the potential influence of strategic nuclear parity on U.S.-Soviet global relations. Indeed, since this is a psychological problem, it can be handled in psychological ways—especially by our appearing to take the matter of parity less seriously. After all, the great cries that parity (or, indeed, Soviet superiority in numbers of land-based missiles) will change U.S.-Soviet relations come basically from sources *within* the United States. Thus the alarm could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, almost entirely because we invest parity with political significance. Of course, some of our European allies are also raising again the specter that we shall fail to defend them with nuclear weapons, now that parity has been reached; but, again,

that is their reading of our self-image—what we project of our “will.”

Parity can, however, be made to mean less politically if we simply assert that it means little; it will mean less still if we emphasize factors other than the relative number of missile launchers (such as the Soviet-American balance of deliverable nuclear warheads); and it could mean almost nothing if we are able to wrap up a far-reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on controlling the arms race. Indeed, it is hard to overemphasize the importance of the SALT talks (and President Nixon's prospective agreement in Moscow), even if the initial agreement does not go very far actually to halt the building of weapons. Almost any SALT agreement will appear to do something important, and will make possible the downgrading of nuclear weapons as factors in each superpower's image of the other's *relative* power, as well as the image that other countries have of the relative power of the two giants.

For this reason, therefore, the President is probably more likely to achieve his objective of preventing the Russians from taking political advantage of strategic nuclear parity—and provoking “crises” in Europe and in the Middle East—by signing a SALT agreement than by emerging from Vietnam in a way that demonstrates our continuing “will.” Of course, he may get both, but if he has to choose—and the mining of Haiphong harbor may yet impose that choice—he would be far better advised to get the SALT agreement rather than seek to impress the Russians with our staying power in South Asia.

A second flaw in the President's current approach relates to a further aspect of American “will.” Faced with what appears to be a form of American neo-isolationism, Mr. Nixon must feel, as argued above, that he must demonstrate to Moscow that it will not be able to profit from any lack of spunk on the part of the American electorate. Yet there is a miscalculation here that goes to the heart of being “unpredictable” in order to confuse the Russians. Each time the President overreacts in a crisis situation that few Americans believe affects U.S. vital interests, he erodes still more the country's will to stand fast behind *any* vital interest beyond our shores. It might be possible, for example, to convince most Americans that our commitment to Europe is vital to us; but they are less likely to take that commitment seriously if the President also invokes the same rhetoric about a part of the world (Vietnam) that most Americans would just as soon see sink to the bottom of the sea. And the Congress, for its part, may become more truculent where, say, maintaining troops in Europe is concerned, as a way of expressing frustration over its inability to have any direct effect on Presidential policy in Vietnam.

President Nixon, like President Johnson before him, may believe that a “cut and run” withdrawal from Vietnam would erode our willingness to support other allies and other commitments, and will show our allies that we cannot be trusted. Yet it is actually more likely that they would respond to an Administration policy that showed a proper regard for what to us is important in the world and what is not. Similarly, we do nothing at all to prop up our allies' belief in our reliability when we paint our-

selves into a corner, as we have repeatedly done in Vietnam, and then *fail*. Our allies, too, can read the temper of American public opinion, as weariness with Vietnam spreads to our view of the rest of the world—not because we have abandoned Vietnam but because we are still there!

It can be argued, therefore, that Russia's view of us has become a deeper concern for the President because we have tried to demonstrate our resolve in Vietnam instead of arguing, by word and deed, that Vietnam would have little effect on our willingness to meet vital commitments elsewhere. We have thus made failure mean far more than it otherwise might. This, in turn, increases the President's need to escalate the war “in order to end it,” after each military defeat for the South Vietnamese army. Every time we fail to impress the Russians—as the Administration sees it—the more important it becomes to impress them on the next occasion. Regrettably, the Soviet Union could not halt the North Vietnamese invasion even if it wanted to do so; thus we give even more hostages to Hanoi's actions.

Another level of U.S.-Soviet relations in Vietnam is hardly less important. That is the effort by the Administration to get the Russians to cooperate in bringing the war to a close on terms that will enable us to demonstrate to the Russians that the President can still buttress American will and, by implication, counter Russian political gains. The paradox is obvious. Nonetheless, the tactic might succeed, provided the President could convince Moscow that it is in its interest to help the United States to disengage without a loss that would erode our image of willingness to use the power at our disposal.

The mechanism the President has been using to achieve this end is the so-called doctrine of “linkage”—the view that all parts of the U.S.-Soviet relationship are necessarily intertwined, and that what happens to it in one part of the world necessarily affects it elsewhere. According to this doctrine, an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations in Europe can make possible better relations in other troubled areas; conversely, difficulties in Southeast Asia cause problems (as the President constantly avers) in the Middle East and Europe.

Following the doctrine of linkage, the President has played an intricate carrot-and-stick game with the Russians. If there is something Moscow wants from us (a SALT agreement, a trade agreement), then it must “behave” in South Asia and help restrain North Vietnam—certainly not back India against Pakistan or supply arms for Hanoi's current offensive. And if Moscow does not cooperate, it will not only lose the things it wants from us but it will also be provoking crises in areas that now appear more or less settled. As Mr. Nixon said to the Russians on television May 8:

We are on the threshold of a new relationship that can serve not only the interests of our two countries but the cause of world peace. We are prepared to continue to build this relationship. The responsibility is yours if we fail to do so.

If it were true that the U.S.-Soviet relationship throughout the world is a seamless web—as it appeared to be in the early 1950s—then this tactic would be both appro-

appropriate and, perhaps, even necessary if we were to avoid a recurrence of "Berlin crises." But the world has changed significantly during the past decade or so. Indeed, the most healthy development in U.S.-Soviet relations since the Cuban missile crisis has been the separating out of each individual area of Soviet-American contention. We no longer have to see our relationship as a whole; we have managed to deal with each problem area as it appears, more or less in its own terms, without worrying that a Soviet "gain" somewhere would necessarily mean a U.S. "loss" in a competition that for some unknown reason must be seen as global. On the contrary, the two superpowers have been able to reach basic understandings on the important problems in Europe, on managing the arms race, and on reducing the risks of superpower confrontation in the Middle East—all despite uncertainties elsewhere, and particularly in Southeast Asia. In 1958, a Cambodian invasion would almost surely have pro-


duced a "Berlin crisis"; in 1970, the SALT talks were convened on the morrow of the invasion without the subject's even being broached by the Soviet delegates! And the same thing has now happened following the mining of Haiphong harbor. So, too, Soviet "cheating" in Egypt after the cease-fire of August 1970 had no effect at all on Soviet-American relations in Europe, or at SALT.

This healthy development is no secret, and is known to the President. He knows that he now can manage his relations with the Russians in separate parcels from place to place around the globe—that there is no real "global" relationship. But he apparently sees an advantage in specifically denying that knowledge. There is, in fact, some question whether he could deny it—asserting the doctrine of linkage between Vietnam and events in the Middle East and Europe—if Soviet-American understandings in these latter areas could indeed be seriously upset by what happens in South Vietnam. That may also seem like a paradox, but it is not. The President can try to manipulate the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship over something as intrinsically inconsequential as Vietnam (I speak here in the context of global strategy) only because he knows that our relationship with Moscow is fundamentally sound and strong in areas of the world far more important to both of us. Indeed, it has long been argued that the United States could never have risked massive involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s, had we not been confident that Berlin (for example) would not be in jeopardy because of what happened in a relative backwater in Southeast Asia.

The President's strategy, therefore, seems straightforward: by threatening to *increase* tensions with the Soviet Union (deny a SALT agreement, refuse trade, set back détente in Europe, warn of "crises" in the Middle East and elsewhere), he hopes to gain a tactical "victory" (or avert a tactical "loss") in an area of peripheral importance. He may succeed. Yet there is room to doubt that the Soviet Union will play his game in Southeast Asia, at least not to the point of actively trying to restrain North Vietnam. Not only is Moscow's influence limited in Hanoi but also there is the fact that the Russians, too, are aware of the relative stability of U.S.-Soviet relations at SALT and in Europe, and of U.S. interests in preserving the stability. They, too, can let tensions rise without worrying about the fundamental stability of East-West relations.

Furthermore, the Russians must be worried lest our current actions strengthen Chinese influence in North Vietnam—a matter of growing concern to Moscow now that it is suspicious of U.S. "collusion" with China following the President's visit. Indeed, the careful wording of President Nixon's address on May 8 may indicate the Administration's intention to promote just such a shift of influence in Hanoi to China's advantage. It is certainly true that mining Haiphong harbor is possible today without seriously disrupting our relations with China, whereas it would not have been possible to run this risk earlier. Nixon's Peking policies have helped; and so has the withdrawal of U.S. forces that could have threatened an invasion of North Vietnam—a serious concern for China.

But even if the Soviet Union does nothing in the current crisis, it is doubtful that the price we shall have to



pay will be worth the gain. For example, by directly challenging Soviet actions in Vietnam for the first time, we are now requiring the Russians to back down in Southeast Asia—thus potentially calling into question *their* “will.” If the Russians do see the matter that way, the upshot could be to stop immediate forward progress in a number of areas in U.S.-Soviet relations where we have some interest in seeing progress continue.

Of course, the Russians may believe that the progressive development of Soviet-American relations elsewhere in the world is more important than supporting North Vietnam at this juncture—or canceling the President’s trip to Moscow. Even so, we have to calculate the long-range costs of the current challenge to the Russians, even if they do nothing now. By past experience, including the Cuban missile crisis and the Six Day War, our symbolic “victories” over the Soviet Union only increase Moscow’s desire to match the United States, weapon for weapon and ship for ship. A similar situation is now shaping up. As in the Cuban missile crisis, we do have local naval superiority over the Soviet Union in the Western Pacific; the Russians cannot force their way into Haiphong harbor, and they will have to shift the focus of action to some other part of the world if they wish to respond with military instruments at all. Again, this step is one that the Russians will be reluctant to take, given the essential understandings we have already reached in Europe and elsewhere—understandings that begin with the need to avoid nuclear confrontation over unimportant matters. But in the long run we must now expect that, once again, the Russians will increase their outlays on defense, and especially on seaborne weapons that will enable them in future not to be faced with the prospect of either backing down before an American challenge,

provoking crises elsewhere, or—finally—confronting the United States with strategic nuclear weapons.

The President is therefore embarked on a risky and ambitious venture in Soviet-American relations. The risks—especially for our desire to moderate the arms race—have been discussed above. But the ambitions are as great. If the United States does succeed in getting the Soviet Union to “back down” now, we shall be tempted to see Soviet power as diminished, or at least “contained.” Thus there could grow further aspiration to “contain” Soviet influence elsewhere, perhaps beginning in South Asia.

Be that as it may, the achievement of this ambitious first step in Vietnam would bring with it more risks, beginning with efforts by Moscow to demonstrate its “will”—including the buildup in forces predicted above, or some other effort. It is also not clear that the Administration would be content with just one demonstration of Soviet lack of will, if the North Vietnamese invasion continued to succeed. Rather we would be apt to escalate the local conflict even further—and along with it the risks to Soviet-American relations—for the purpose of again buttressing our will in Soviet eyes and not losing a tactical advantage in the “global” competition! And once again, we would be “throwing down the gauntlet” in ways that, whatever the outcome, will not promote long-range and productive U.S.-Soviet relations. Indeed, if the President conceives all this as demonstrating U.S. “will”—and helping to build a generation of peace—he has chosen a peculiar road to his goal. Far better for him to consider again the one option he has rejected—a simple withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. We would be far less likely to damage our ability to cope with Soviet power in the future by this step than we are by trying to manipulate larger risks of confrontation with the Soviet Union. □

NEW DAY ON THE CLYDE

WORKERS SAVE THE SHIPYARDS

EDITH CURRAN

Miss Curran, a free-lance writer, has held a number of elective offices in the British trade union organization.

The shipyard workers on the Scottish Clydeside have a long history of militancy but the action they have taken in the last few months, to prevent the closure of several yards on the Upper Clyde, and avert the consequences of rising unemployment, is unprecedented. It marks not only a new mood—which was demonstrated also in the recent miners’ strike—but, arising from that mood, a new method. As their tactic of resistance they have adopted the work-in.

The Clyde shipyards, once the greatest shipbuilding industry in the world, had sunk into obsolescence, mainly because the shipowners had failed to reinvest in the industry and to modernize it to meet the competition of advanced technology from abroad. This fault has been attested to in reports of official inquiries and statements by

government ministers, including John Davies, the present minister responsible for industry.

Back in 1965, the Labour government set up a committee of inquiry to see how the industry might be revived and made competitive in world markets. Its findings, known as the Geddes Report after its chairman, criticized the mismanagement of the industry and made proposals which led in 1967 to setting up the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) consortium, a merger of five yards on the upper reaches of the river that was later reduced to four when one of the yards withdrew and was subsidized separately.

It was hoped that UCS, with the help of government funds, could carry out improvements which would put the yards back on their feet. The government held a 48.4 per cent share of the enterprise and gave it a 5.5 per cent interest-free loan, for the first three years. But the consortium started out under several handicaps. The old shipowners who had impoverished the industry were still in-

fluent in its councils and it was saddled with deficits, high interest payments and unprofitable contracts inherited from the past. Grants and loans were invariably short of what the industry requested and insufficient for its needs.

Reliable estimates indicate that, had the consortium been relieved of the burdens of the past and given the necessary injections of cash to meet interim payments for supplies, the outlook would have been hopeful. The Geddes Report concluded that the world market for merchant ships had grown, would continue to grow, and was open to a competitive British industry. In a report written for the Shipbuilding Industry Board in May 1971, its chairman described the structure and facilities of UCS as "now better than they have been since the war," and went on to say that "with the end of loss-making orders, more settled industrial relations and improved production, the company should make the long awaited return to profitability." The same appraisal was made by the *Glasgow Herald* in June 1971, the paper forecasting that, provided the UCS could stay in business, it had an excellent chance to obtain £100 million worth of orders, in addition to the existing order book of £90 million.

Yet, despite these and other expert opinions on the favorable outlook for the UCS, John Davies, Minister of State for Trade and Industry in the Tory government, announced to the House of Commons in June 1971 that his department had decided to refuse a requested grant of £6 million to the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.

Why was the Conservative government so eager to write off the Upper Clyde shipyards, describing the industry as "a lame duck"? One reason can be found in the basic philosophy of Conservatism, which abhors public ownership and government subsidies—except in a few favored areas. (For example, Heath's government gave a very substantial subsidy to International Computers, Ltd., at the very time when it was saying that companies which couldn't make it on their own should go under.) But other reasons can be guessed at. The UCS was set up by the Labour government. It is also probable that there was a reluctance to come to terms with a well-organized and militant body of workers. (Though during the life of the UCS the workers cooperated in helping to "make a go of it." They agreed to relax a number of working practices and reduced absenteeism.) Finally, wages on the Upper Clyde are higher than those of the yards on the Lower Clyde, where workers have been struggling to obtain parity. That might provide a further motive for wishing to reduce the Upper Clyde.

As will be seen below, the government's view of the state of the industry and what should be done about it was in direct contradiction to that of the experts. As a consequence, they not only wished to liquidate a number of the yards but were eager to conclude the business as quickly as possible before entering Europe. The Minister, John Davies, stated in August 1971 that the proposed action on UCS stemmed from the need to make Britain a competitive member of the Common Market.

Evidence of the Tories' determination to dismantle the Upper Clyde even before they won the election is revealed in a confidential memorandum, apparently written

in late 1969 by Nicholas Ridley, who was at the time Assistant Minister of Trade in the Tory "shadow" cabinet. This memorandum and related documents fell into the hands of the Clydeside shop stewards, who published them last September.

After reviewing the condition of the Upper Clyde shipyards in very gloomy terms, Mr. Ridley made a series of alternative proposals and summed up as follows:

I believe that we should do the following on assuming office:

- (a) Give no more public money to UCS.
- (b) Let Yarrow leave the UCS if they still want to and facilitate their joining Lower Clyde if they still wish to do so.

(Note: Yarrow is the yard which subsequently did withdraw from the consortium.)

- (c) This would lead to the bankruptcy of the UCS.

We could accept this, in which case Lower Clyde would take one or two of the yards.

After a somewhat overoptimistic assessment of the number of men who could be redeployed in other sectors of the industry, the memorandum continues:

We could put in a Government "Butcher" to cut up UCS and to sell (cheaply) to Lower Clyde, and others, the assets of UCS to minimise upheaval and dislocation. I am having further views on the practicality of such an operation.

- (d) After liquidation or reconstruction as above, we should sell the Government holding in UCS, even for a pittance.

It is of some interest to note in this connection that Ken Douglas, who was manager of UCS, stated publicly that Mr. Ridley had talked to the UCS management for only an hour before making a report that recommended "butchering" an industry. Since the memorandum is confidential, there is no evidence to show whether or not the government accepted the advice given. However, its subsequent actions would suggest that it did.

Following publication of these documents, the UCS Shop Stewards Co-ordinating Committee demanded that Nicholas Ridley "be removed from his ministerial responsibility and that his 'butchery' policy be totally abandoned by the Government." (In a recent ministerial shuffle, Mr. Ridley has been dropped.) Failing in its quest for sustaining funds from the government, the UCS called in a liquidator, and Mr. Davies set up a group of four men—known ironically in some quarters as "The Four Wise Men" to review the position and recommend which yards should be preserved and which shut down.

At that time unemployment in Scotland stood at 134,000. In August 1971 it represented 8.2 per cent of the population and it was estimated that one in ten of the male working population was without work. The work force in the yards, which in 1960 had numbered approximately 20,000, was down to 8,500.

Against this background, and with a provisional liquidator already installed in the shipyards, the shop stewards decided not to await the report of the four men appointed by Davies, but to prepare for action in case the report and the decisions arising from it were negative, as seemed probable. Mass meetings were held at the yards, and these

solidly backed the stewards' decisions. It was unanimously determined that no closures would be accepted, that all four yards must be kept open and that if attempts were made to close any of them down the workers would take them over and operate them. Meanwhile, the workers were to carry on as usual and to resist any attempts at closures.

Support from other sectors was soon forthcoming. The local town council, aware of the appalling consequences to the whole Clydeside of shutdowns in the area's key industry, announced its full cooperation. The effect of closures would spread to almost everyone, from boilermakers, steelworkers and management staffs to local shopkeepers. The Scottish Trades Union Congress fully endorsed the shipyard workers' position and, as the days passed, workers from other areas, town councils, clergy (who formed an interdenominational committee), and many others declared their solidarity with the men at the yards.

A delegation of 450, consisting of workers from all the affected industries, civic officials and many others, chartered a train to take them to London and confront the Prime Minister in Downing Street. Edward Heath, though he felt obliged to meet a deputation from this body, was unable or unwilling to give any assurance that there would be no closures and no dismissals. Jimmy Reid, UCS shop steward and Clydebank Town Councillor, who has been a leading figure throughout the work-in and who was one of the deputation meeting with the Prime Minister said after the interview:


To us it seems that it is the 1930s all over again, but this time there is one difference. We are not going to queue for the dole. We are going back to the yards and we are not leaving.

Pending the report of the "Four Wise Men," the liquidator announced to management and workers his plan for the yards. He intended to suspend work on a number of contracts and redeploy the work force to those contracts which would provide the quickest cash return. He recognized that there would not be work for the total force, but promised that those for whom there was no work would be put on paid leave. The workers, however, recognized the proposals as preliminaries to closure and decided not to accept either paid leave or suspension of contracts.

A meeting attended by 800 shop stewards, full-time trade union officials, clergy and representatives from industry all over the west of Scotland adopted a plan for a token work stoppage and a march through the streets of Glasgow. On the agreed date 100,000 workers stopped work and more than 50,000 marched. The march ended in a huge meeting and rousing speeches, with repeated declarations against contraction of the shipbuilding industry. The marchers included men and women from all over Britain; it has been described by Alasdair Buchan in *The Right to Work* as "the greatest demonstration since the Chartists."

By this time the determination of the workers and the groundswell of support from outside the industry was recognized by the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party leadership. Harold Wilson visited the yards and Anthony Wedgewood Benn, the Labour Minister who had been responsible for setting up the UCS, was a frequent visitor there. He joined the march through Glasgow and told the meeting later that in his view the Labour government had made a serious mistake by failing to nationalize the industry instead of setting up the consortium.

On July 29, 1971, John Davies told the House of



Shipyards on the Clyde

Commons that the report of his committee of four had been accepted. Their conclusion was: "Any continuation of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in its present form would be wholly unjustified. . . ." The facts and figures from which they derived this conclusion have never been made public. The composition of this committee of four is worth a glance: the chairman of a distillery company, a company director, a figure prominent in the shipbuilding world and Lord Robens, who headed the nationalized coal industry for a decade, but who has since made it known that he is no longer a Socialist.

On the day following Davies' statement in the Commons, the shop stewards took control of the yards in the name of the workers whom they represented, these being engineers, boilerworkers, steelworkers and others.

Vincent Hanna, industrial correspondent of the *Sunday Times Business News*, who was the only journalist present in the yards at the time of the take-over, described the events:

The Revolution came to Clydeside at 10.34 a.m. on Friday. Gerry Ross, the 60 year old Boilermakers' convenor, acting on behalf of the shop stewards, walked up to Alex Stewart, the security man who had watched over the main gate at John Brown's [shipyard] for 35 years—since the Queen Mary was launched—and announced:

"By the authority of the Shop Stewards Committee, and the Co-ordinating Committee of the trade union movement of the Upper Clyde Shipyards, the workers hereby take over this yard. You will now take orders from the shop stewards only." He then explained kindly, in his own and not his convenor's voice: "We understand your position Alex, but we decide who comes in and out of the yard." And John McGunnigal, representing the General and Municipal Workers, underlined the new situation. "Alex," he said, "you're one of my members. I'm watching you."

At 10.42 three members of the committee went to the management offices in the yard, intending to force their way into the boardroom. The door was unlocked and after a few minutes they came out again. The workers were in control.

The liquidator tried to resist the take-over but was in no position to do so; he was also unable to keep the press and television out of the yards.

In his capacity as spokesman for the shop stewards, Jimmy Reid said, announcing the take-over:

This is the first campaign of its kind in the history of trade unionism. We are taking over the yard because we refuse to accept that faceless men can make these decisions. We will conduct ourselves with dignity and discipline. The world is watching us and it is our duty to act with maturity and dignity. The shipyard men at UCS are no wildcats. They want to work. The real wildcats are in 10 Downing Street. The biggest mistake we could make would be to lie down, capitulate and grovel. We don't only build ships on the Clyde. We build men, and Davies has taken on the wrong people.

The work-in has proceeded now for approximately six months and has been accompanied by extraordinary demonstrations of solidarity from workers in other industries, from civic bodies and from public opinion. Wage bills have been met by levies in the shipyards and factories, and also by very substantial cash donations from trade union-

ists abroad—from Sweden, Holland, France, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the USSR, among others. An interesting "side effect" is that James Reid, who has from the beginning played a brilliant role in the work-in, has been elected unanimously by the students of Glasgow University as its rector, an academic appointment which it is safe to say has never before been held by a member of the industrial working class. Reid started his working life in a white-collar job, became a Marxist and moved into industry.

There was enough work on current orders to keep things going for some time. Problems were dealt with as they arose. For example, when work at one of the "condemned" yards was running low, the shop stewards brought pressure to bear on the liquidator and got his consent to transfer a keel which lay at one of the yards scheduled to be saved to the one in need.

Genuine efforts to buy one or more of the yards were stymied by the government's refusal to provide financial help. French trade unionists warned the Clydeside workers that shipowners from Le Havre and Dieppe planned to try to buy some of the yards on the cheap. Speaking about this Jimmy Reid said: "They are not coming to Britain to buy Clydeside skills for 9/6d. an hour [47 new pence]. . . . We welcome French trade unionists but we wouldn't let French employers in the gate."

In recent months union and management representatives have several times traveled to Houston, Tex., to negotiate with firms interested in buying the Clydebank yard. This has now narrowed down to one company, the Marathon Manufacturing Co. of Houston and negotiations are at an advanced point, agreement hinging now on the willingness of the government to provide £12 million in grants and loans to the company, which proposes to build oil rigs at the yard.

On February 28, Davies announced in the House that the government was now prepared to accept proposals for a new shipbuilding scheme for the Upper Clyde, and for this purpose was prepared to grant £35 million. A three-yard complex is envisaged, omitting only Clydebank, which, it is hoped, will be bought by one of the firms from Texas. The shop stewards committee has held to the position throughout that the work-in will terminate only when the future of all four yards has been settled satisfactorily and with it the jobs of the entire work force.

There is some reason to hope at this time that the government will show a modicum of good sense and come to an agreement with the U.S. company.

The work-in is not, as Hanna described it, a revolution, except in method. The shipyard men have been and are fighting to save the industry and to keep their jobs, and through their action they have achieved both these objectives. Without the work-in and the widespread support it received the story would be quite different today and the Clydeside would now present an even grimmer picture than at present of dole queues and depression. The Tories have been given a salutary lesson and the workers have learned a good deal about controlling their own economic destiny. And when before in trade union history have the workers managed to parlay a £6 million refusal into a £35 million subsidy? □

The Candidates Discover the People

MARY ELLEN LEARY

Miss Leary has been a West Coast political writer for more than twenty years, most of them on the Scripps-Howard San Francisco News. She is now a free-lance writer.

San Francisco

"We've finally reached the sweepstakes." The speaker is a Humphrey leader in his California legislative office. The phone is at his ear; a car waits at the door; a plane is to be caught; a TV show is to be screened live in Los Angeles. Three tensed-up secretaries press for a word before he vanishes. "All those other primaries were buildup. This one clinches the convention. Hubert will make it."

Down the capital hallway, another legislator, a key McGovern man, is just as busy: "This primary we've got to take. This is crucial for the convention. And with the momentum we've got, we will. Stick your finger out the window; you can almost feel the rush to McGovern."

California has a big ego, and politics are always important when they reach *this* state. But with a contest as evenly balanced as the Democratic Party rivalry between Hubert H. Humphrey and George McGovern, and with the June 6th primary stakes so critical—271 winner-take-all delegates in the largest state—there is some justification for sizing this up as the most decisive among the state-by-state tussles.

Near the end now, it seems a dead heat. McGovern has the advantages of surprise, of novelty and of his astonishing momentum; but Humphrey has his superb campaign vitality, and an invaluable component of affection. His labor supporters are hurling a venomous barrage against McGovern, painting him a dangerous radical whose ideas would threaten American society with chaos and insure Nixon's re-election. Despite the damage that may do, some political seers prophesy an enormous McGovern sweep. The prevailing view, though, is that the vote is so closely divided among the urban and suburban white majority that the deciding factor is likely to be the vote cast by blacks and Chicanos. The strategy in both camps is pitched to that probability.

Outside the tumult accompanying people close to either candidate, and beyond a half-block radius of either campaign headquarters, there has been strikingly little political excitement in the state. Compared to the extravaganzas of past campaigns, especially that impassioned contest for the Democratic nomination in 1968, when a different pair of U.S. Senators, Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy, reached a crescendo in California (that then was so shockingly snuffed out), this year's reach for the Democratic vote is so quiet as almost to have an air of unreality.

There are reasons. For one, media use is astonishingly low key. Until these closing weeks there has been almost no candidate visibility. Television is not quite passé as a campaign medium, but it is being used differently. The media years were 1964, 1966 and 1968. Now showmanship is out, and people are in style. For the McGovern campaign, superbly organized to reach out to people, hand

in hand, face to face, the slick, professional programming of a candidate via the tube is the antithesis of the homely, honest credibility his people aim to convey. Humphrey's campaign is less well endowed with volunteers; indeed, it rattles around a bit emptily in some of the headquarters. It therefore needs and is using television, but its emphasis is also on people, ordinary people. The half-hour phone-in is the favorite program: the candidate, bolstered by two or three allies, and with some press on hand to assure objectivity, takes direct phone calls from the neighborhood.

Another explanation for the hush is boredom. Primaries have been firing off across the country with such frequency that California voters can't quite believe it is their turn, nor do they seem to care. Politicking has gone stale. Only in the last week or so has the California primary sparked into life as insults began to loft over Democratic camps. In this stretch, the two champions have at each other, the usual noisy circus of political attendants being tuned way down.

Many prominent Democrats have found themselves idling on the sidelines since Senator Muskie quit the primaries. For months, the Muskie forces had paraded most of California's big-name Democrats, including U.S. Sen. John Tunney, state Senate president pro tem James R. Mills, Assembly Speaker Bob Moretti, Secretary of State Edmund G. Brown, Jr., former national committeeman Paul Ziffren, Reps. Thomas Rees and Jerome Waldie, and on and on. Endorsements, it suddenly became clear, are not all that important for Presidential aspirants. Humphrey thus gained undisputed possession of the "middle Progressive" position he favors, but about half of Muskie's men seem to be quietly turning to McGovern.

The shuffling about of so many candidates, now in, now out, is bewildering. California Democrats will find on their ballots every name that has figured in the early form books except that of Wallace, whose cohorts couldn't qualify him in time. Lindsay, Muskie, McCarthy, Yorty, Chisholm, Humphrey, McGovern: how can the average voter know which are for real?

Indeed, for a sizable number clamoring to express themselves, the greatest reality encompasses George Wallace whose campaign directors threw together a California drive for write-in votes after the Maryland shooting. The attempt is so beset by legal hurdles and election technicalities as to leave Wallaceites frustrated and angry. It has been assumed that most Wallace votes would fall to Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty or to the American Independent Party. The latter, with an unpledged delegation, has shrunk by more than half from its 100,000 voters of four years ago. Neither the Humphrey nor the McGovern camp seriously expects its California performance to be altered by Wallace's strengthened position nor by sympathy votes.

The very contrast between the comfortable familiarity of Humphrey and the astonishing rise of a man thought to be totally unknown heightens the last-minute drama but makes it all seem storybook. It was one thing to read of unexpected McGovern wins off in Ohio, Wisconsin or

Nebraska, but the May 10th California poll by Mervin D. Field showed that McGovern has risen in three months from 7 per cent popularity in California to 31 per cent, hot on the heels of Senator Humphrey's 35 per cent (which was itself up 10 per cent in the same period), with hardly a rustle in the grass to indicate that McGovern people were about. Where did all that support come from?

The chief event stimulating political interest now is the war—the real war, the bombing, mining, nerved-up war in Vietnam. No matter how much reaction the escalation has engendered across the country, California considers itself particularly sensitive to the war: threshold to it, last port from which the carriers sail, embarkation point from which munitions are shipped, the home air base to which so many wounded and dead have been returned. This geographic proximity or the large number of university and college campuses (158 public campuses alone) has permitted anti-war young people to affect markedly the state's political climate. Unless it can be magically erased—and magic is one of the few tricks President Nixon has not yet pulled out of his hat—it will be the dominant factor on June 6. (The issue will hardly diminish President Nixon's following with the GOP. His challenger is Rep. John Ashbrook, embraced a few days ago by the radical Right when the United Republicans of California voted 521 to 60 to support him over the President, and labeled Henry Kissinger "an effete, arrogant, intellectual snob." Ashbrook considers the latest military moves "too little and too late," a view not typical of any California bloc.)

A few weeks ago Senator McGovern was being shrugged off as a "dove," a "one-issue candidate," and that issue negligible compared to economic problems pressing upon the wage earner. The importance of bread-and-butter questions projected Senator Humphrey into prominence, even when Senator Muskie seemed the man to beat. Humphrey has a long career as labor's champion, but revving up the war seems sharply to favor McGovern.

There is a nightmare feeling abroad that the election which approaches will be a replay of four years ago, when Vietnam was the central issue. However, the leading Democratic personalities are different, and their stand against the war is almost identical, thus obliterating Humphrey's position in 1968. But what the military escalation emphasizes most in California is the public sense of having been misled.

Says Assemblyman Ken Cory of Orange County, one of the new, articulate Democrats in the legislature (and a McGovern man): "People remember that just a bit ago President Nixon was promising to wind it all down. Four years ago he pledged to end it. No American wants to lose a war, but there is no faith in this war, and there is no faith in the government's report on the war and no faith in what the next step will be."

"The gut thing with people today is whether they can trust the government." So says John Vasconcellos, Democratic legislator from the San Jose area, who has a reputation for straight talk himself. "There is an explosive amount of skepticism about, and it is the major issue in this primary. People have come to distrust all institutions. Politicians just happen to be more visible than other in-

stitutional symbols, so they make good targets. The problem is that leaders aren't candid about the kinds of trouble we're in and people discover that what happens doesn't match what was promised. The credibility gap is immense."

Politicians are not the only ones who cite discontent and distrust as the dominant mood. Bank economists, newspaper editorial writers, ministers, professors, consider hostility to the "Establishment," to bigness, developers, utilities and oil companies, to high taxes, to all the shapers of today's world as a dominant component of public attitudes in California. Some Democrats recall Jess Unruh's 1970 campaign for governor, when he dramatized opposition to moneyed interests by TV stunts at the doors of millionaires' homes or stores. Unruh says today that the sentiment was already formed: he only gave it visibility.

Apart from the war, many of the issues most related to political discontent in California would seem to favor Senator Humphrey. He is more experienced in urban problems, identified for twenty-five years with attempts to achieve racial equality, is author of medical protection plans (all Californians place medical care with jobs at the head of their priority lists). Most important, Humphrey stars in areas related to income, prices and taxes.

California is not enjoying an economic upturn to match that of the Eastern states, where improved sales of heavy consumer goods have had an effect. The slump in California has "bottomed out," business conditions are some better, but the expectation for improvement is paced more slowly here. California industry is not of the quick-turn variety. Aerospace and missile making still constitute 30 per cent of the state's manufacturing (they were 38 per cent at their peak, in 1968) and that field is no cause for cheer. In aerospace, even national employment figures are dropping. The state's total unemployment in April was 6.3 per cent. The national percentage was 5.9, and displeasure over prices and apprehension over jobs, despite the Presidential control agencies, is that much more acute in California. In the minority communities within Los Angeles, San Francisco and Oakland, grossly underrepresented in official figures, unemployment is thought to be closer to 35 per cent.

Local property taxes have rocketed 10 to 15 per cent annually in recent years, and revolt is not too strong a word to describe taxpayer reaction. It is evidenced by wholesale refusal to approve bonds for schools, which formerly commanded popular support. California schools are underfinanced to a shocking degree, in many aspects below national averages. State taxes jolted upward this year and payroll deductions for state income tax have just commenced, yet the state's most serious fiscal problem is how to find nearly \$1 billion more to shift school costs to the state (and reduce local taxes) under a court mandate to finance education equally for all children.

However, none of the statistics conveys the impact of California's woe as graphically as does Assemblyman Cory's report from his Orange County district, long considered the heartland of conservatism, but where Democratic strength is now mounting. "We put on a political meeting the other day for McGovern, which drew 600 in attendance, most of them men. It was an astonishing success, one of the largest crowds ever at a political meeting in the county. But let me tell you who they were—an

association of unemployed aerospace workers. They didn't have anything else to do."

Cory has other illustrations of hard times. When he was first in office in 1966, he received no more than one or two letters a month from his district about welfare problems. Today he has an aide assigned full time to handling this one issue. "I knew times had really changed," he said, "when the ladies who put on those coffee meetings for me in my elegant, white, Anglo-Saxon ghetto began asking how to get food stamps."


Californians sometimes refer to government as the state's "biggest industry." At the federal, state and local levels, it has about 1.5 million people in government jobs, 21 per cent of the work force (compared to a national average of 18 per cent). Of late, university maintenance men have walked off their jobs in a wage demand, and state workers on the gigantic water project voted almost 90 per cent to strike for higher pay, even though they can be dismissed for such "illegal" work stoppages. University professors, three years denied any cost-of-living increase by Governor Reagan's blue pencil, have gone so far as to undertake formal study of the possibilities of joining unions. Said the faculty senate at staid Riverside campus: "Joining a collective bargaining agency . . . is an appropriate means . . . for seeking to strengthen the university. . . ." But the ultimate outcry over inadequate wages, at a time of rising prices and taxes, is an initiative which the California State Employees Association proposes for the November ballot and for which it already has more than enough signatures. It would bar a governor from vetoing salary levels established by the legislature.

Senator McGovern speaks to such brooding concerns with his call for "new priorities," for tax reform, for

reduction in military spending. The problem for Senator Humphrey is to bring this accumulated wrath into focus in his own behalf. On paper, it is easy. The substance of the Humphrey vote in California is in three categories: labor, the black community and the elderly. They are expected to be loyal. The substance of McGovern strength is still a mystery, but the consensus is that he must stand up to labor in California and must explicitly challenge Humphrey to clarify his own positions.

One difficulty Humphrey faces is that AFL-CIO leadership, at the state as well as the national level, is refusing to endorse among the Democrats in the primary. California federation head John Henning, former Under Secretary of Labor and Ambassador to New Zealand, has said he will remain neutral. "And that means," he has told the politicians, "no more neutral against McGovern than neutral against Humphrey." A caustic California speech in which COPE director Al Barkan criticized McGovern's views has helped Humphrey, and numerous individual union leaders are working for him. One of his most energetic supporters is Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco, who has powerful alliances with labor. He has been an effective fund raiser, has been speaking all over the country in recent months and is now giving all that is asked to help Humphrey in California. It seems a curious waste of talent that he is being dispatched to speak frequently to union meetings, if labor is indeed so solid for HHH.

It appears that the monolithic labor unanimity which Humphrey campaigners would like to project is being nibbled away by McGovern. Some union officials have endorsed him; a few who had drifted to Muskie are eyeing McGovern as the replacement. However, the singularly effective club being wielded against McGovern is word



Oliphant, Denver Post

"All for Humphrey over McGovern—I Hope We're Getting a Representative Cross Section."

that in 1966 he voted against labor on the matter of repealing Section 14-B (state right-to-work laws) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Cory, from conservative Orange County, can laugh this off: "Hell, in my district that just proves he is not a left-wing kook. They will like his independence." But that is not the prevailing view. A wrong vote on "right to work" has enormous symbolic significance to California labor, which still remembers its last really effective political involvement in 1958, when on this issue it trounced U.S. Sen. William Knowland's bid for the governorship and installed Edmund G. Brown.

Labor is also attacking McGovern in California for his votes against the space shuttle and the Lockheed loan, both of which involve thousands of jobs in this state. For old-line labor, it is one more telling pro-Humphrey argument, but it fails to make many converts. The unemployed and disenchanted in California are ready to abandon aerospace and defense production if someone will gear up technology for such domestic tasks as waste disposal, rapid transit and water or air pollution. They are profoundly impressed to discover that a corn-belt Senator out of South Dakota was arguing eight years ago for a systematic conversion to peacetime "soft" ware.

The core of the attack upon McGovern centers on positions he is alleged to have taken on abortion, marijuana, amnesty and school bussing. "The more McGovern's views become known, the more he will frighten away those Democrats whose aspirations for America are in the moderate progressive mold," says Mayor Alioto. "This man is an extremist. He would be vulnerable to devastating attack by President Nixon in November, if he were the Democratic nominee. The Republicans are cunning. They would murder him, and the Democratic Party wouldn't recover for years." Says McGovern press aide Henry Weinstein, "They used that kind of garbage in conservative Nebraska and it didn't destroy us. In California it will bomb."

The thrust of McGovern's campaign is precisely to get his views known, accurately of course, and to get known the wide range of his proposals to set new priorities. He has some clarifying to do yet, in the face of the Humphrey implications. On the other hand, a Humphrey statement on bussing in California, where so much rests on the black vote, would be interesting indeed.

"Issue" talk is very big in California, in the context of college-level interest, and an abnormal amount of brochure reading is going on. Even the Humphrey side gets its pamphlets read, and they make a strenuous effort to inform the young about Humphrey's legislative record. "We may not win them over but we lower the antagonism level," said one Humphrey campaigner who makes a practice of campus talks. "When Humphrey wins, they will accept him." Such acceptance would be grudging, but many young people volunteered that they expect to vote Democratic against President Nixon, no matter who is the nominee.

Labor votes won't help Humphrey much if they aren't rallied on Election Day. Lacking organizational structure, Humphrey campaigners rely heavily on COPE for such assistance, but planning has been delayed while union attorneys unsnarl the proprieties of spending union funds under the new federal elections law and under recent Department of Justice suits related to improper use of

union money in political campaigning. "It will all come together with a terrific labor push in the last days," one Humphrey man said. "They'll get the votes out." But he betrayed inner anxiety by adding, "They'd better!"

In sharp contrast is McGovern's enormous array of zealous volunteers, who turn out a prodigious amount of orderly, thoughtful work. Ask for McGovern's stand on bussing and the staff aide whistles. "Wow! Look at this research job. The whole history of bussing. Every politician's stand. Our man's every word. You want it short? Here it is. Detailed? Here it is."

Bands of young people start off at 6 A.M. daily to meet workers at factory gates and hand out McGovern pamphlets with the kind of saturation technique that paid off in Wisconsin. True, Southern California is not as thoroughly organized as are northern areas, but even there thousands turn out on weekends.

The aim of the McGovern plan in California is nothing less than to have every Democratic voter—there are 5 million—approached twice. "Staggering, eh? Nobody ever tried it before," the young gloat. They won't make it, of course, but they had more than 10,000 young people out during the first two weekends in May. The key is careful organization of the youthful student troops. Every college has been combed for leadership. Student body presidents and student newspaper editors have become captains, directing their own cohorts in the most massive doorbell ringing in state history. The crucial point is to report back on contacts that favor McGovern. On Election Day, these are the people who will be exhorted to the polls.

The numbers and the youth of such volunteers have been emphasized, but more significant is their experience. Most worked in the 1968 primary and in peace drives or other campaigns since. Jess Unruh refers to this cadre as "middle management" and says they meet the party's major weakness in California. "What we lacked in the past was not foot soldiers or money gatherers. We were terribly weak in the middle intelligence that could plot how to win campaigns, map precincts to focus upon, analyze statistics and draw up strategy. This is the quality suddenly evident on both sides this year, but most strikingly with McGovern."

The latest registration figures show that the Democratic margin is growing in California. Los Angeles is now almost 2 to 1 Democratic, one reason why Unruh, former aspirant for the governorship, now aims to be mayor there. The state shows Democrats to number 56.4 per cent of the voters (it was 54.9 per cent in 1968) and Republicans 38.3 per cent (down from 40.3 per cent in 1968). This shift may be something for Mr. Nixon to fret about in November, but right now what is significant is the large interest the minorities are taking in the election.

Although Californians of Mexican descent number about 3 million, about 15 per cent of the population, and they are making a strenuous effort to get their fair ratio of representation at all levels, politicians figure the Chicano vote will number about 300,000. It is a critical target group because it has no predisposition toward either candidate. Spanish-language radio messages, pamphlets and even TV specials are flooding Southern California and agricultural pockets throughout the state. For this audience, media is in great demand.

This election marks the first time the Chicano vote has been considered important enough to fight for, and it happens that the Mexican-American community is in a ferment of political consciousness, the older Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA) sometimes jolted aside by the younger and more aggressive Confederacion de la Raza Unida. Both of them often upset Democratic strategy as they experiment with their new prowess and their new popularity in politics.

Both Humphrey and McGovern are trying to establish some confidence in this community. Humphrey has his natural affinity for the poor; McGovern has one important asset, the Kennedy mantle. The Kennedy family, particularly Robert Kennedy, is passionately revered among Chicanos. Radio programs using Robert Kennedy's voice in approval of McGovern are aired frequently. Young Joseph III and Kathleen, oldest children of Robert Kennedy, are stumping for McGovern, with special concentration in the Chicano neighborhoods. It might be expected that Cesar Chavez would have a role, but he is in an uncomfortable bind. His farm labor organizing drive needs the support of the AFL-CIO to which he now belongs. This Humphrey alliance counters his Kennedy loyalties, and he is not expected to take a position.

Secretary of State Brown estimates that blacks this year constitute 10 to 12 per cent of the state's potential voters. Here the situation is different. The overwhelming bulk of the blacks, all those over 35, are assumed to be Humphrey supporters, just as are all senior citizen Democrats. Organization to get this black vote to the polls is under way largely through church committees. But the young black vote is thought to be as unpersuaded and as open to new impressions as is the Chicano. Vying for their votes are two rival groups which divide the remarkably talented black political leadership that has become influential in the top Democratic posts in California. These black politicians are convinced that their minority community in California has an exceptional political awareness. The experience of peaceful protest through bank and hotel sit-ins six years back, and even some of the militant protest led by the Black Panthers, has schooled this community to look beyond civil rights to broader participation in the financial and political structures. Even the trials of Bobby Seale, the Soledad brothers and Angela Davis have been politically awakening.

Said Willie Brown, black San Francisco assemblyman who wields great power as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee: "The black community in California is unlike that in any other state. It is independent. Its political outlook is not bound by tradition, or led by bosses, or coerced by poverty. There is more interest in issues and a far wider consciousness of political movements among the ordinary blacks on the street." Brown is a leader in the McGovern campaign.

State Sen. Mervyn Dymally, Democratic Party caucus leader in the upper house, is co-chairman of the Humphrey campaign. "The black student can't be fooled," he says. "The new black in California is looking for a candidate he can identify with. He wants a sense of commitment. He is looking for hope quite as much as he is looking for jobs." Other Southern California black assemblymen divide: Bill Greene for Humphrey; Leon Ralph from

Watts for McGovern. In the north John Miller, assemblyman from Oakland, joins Brown in the McGovern camp.

Given the infinite planning of the McGovern strategy, the staff is not content with just going after the young black vote. They reason that it will split evenly in the metropolitan areas; hence their black leadership is saturating the small towns where minorities are easier to reach.

Many blacks view the Shirley Chisholm campaign as a symbol of their higher level of political awareness. She is supported by Rep. Ronald Dellums of Berkeley, but it is strictly a "poor person's campaign," running via mimeograph machines and space to paint your own poster, if you bring the cardboard and colors. Its energy comes from Women's Lib and the Black Panthers—a handy corner to tuck away the radicals, one observer said.

But Bill Greene said, "The things Shirley is talking about, we will all push when we get to the convention. We respect her running." If the outcome between Humphrey and McGovern is so close that her votes affect the result, that respect may diminish.

The Chisholm camp has managed a few fund-raising rock concerts but gleanings have been in the \$25 range, quite different from the sums reaped for McGovern in four concerts arranged by Warren Beatty and Julie Christie, and studded with such names as Barbra Streisand, James Taylor, Judy Collins and the rock group Chicago. These have netted the campaign well over \$400,000, a welcome assist for McGovern's own checkbook supporters, such as Los Angeles textile millionaire Miles Ruben, who put his own energy into the drive along with his money.

Another California phenomenon is the move among the young into politics at the local level. Since students at Berkeley showed how organization can lead to the take-over of a city, the young people, on campus or recently off, have generated tremendous interest in problems near at hand and small enough in scope to be manageable. They have, as a matter of fact, changed the course of several city councils and elected to them people sensitive to environmental concerns and hostile to continuing massive growth. Obviously they have not yet slowed the current, for March was California's largest home-building month in eight years. The supply of surplus housing is ominous.

A confrontation is approaching between this environmental sensitivity and a coalition of the developer interests, such as utilities, oil companies, banks and real estate. It will probably come over an ambitious and precedent-setting piece of legislation offered this year to control California's seacoast development. But a more immediate confrontation is on the June ballot. Proposition 9 is a sweeping and somewhat chaotic constitutional proposal aimed at "clean" air, land and sea. It would, for instance, ban oil drilling offshore, and stave off shoreline nuclear power plants for five years. Every business interest and labor organization has joined to oppose Proposition 9, and funds to beat it are ample. But so strong is the California revulsion against "bigness," and so deep the hunger for priorities that give preference to people, rather than business, that the proposition is expected to draw a very large vote, and may even pass. It can't help but affect the Democratic primary. □

BOOKS & THE ARTS

Scaring Hell out of the Country—for Twenty-five Years

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE ORIGINS OF McCARTHYISM. By Richard M. Freeland. Alfred A. Knopf. 419 pp. \$10.

LEO P. RIBUFFO

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Almost from the start of the cold war, "revisionist" historians have been trying to transform the study (and ultimately the conduct) of American foreign relations. As early as 1952, William Appleman Williams suggested, among other heresies, that the founding fathers cherished imperial dreams; that economic motives, broadly conceived, fostered the creation of an "informal empire" at the turn of the 20th century; and that the United States shared responsibility for the armed truce which followed World War II. Arno Mayer and Gabriel Kolko concurred in Williams' dissent from orthodoxy and, particularly since the mid-1960s, their complementary analyses have been documented, extended, and refined by scholars like Walter LaFeber, Lloyd Gardner and N. Gordon Levin. After two decades of scholarship (and seven years of informal war in Southeast Asia) it is now respectable, even in the most select graduate seminars, to submit that the revisionists may have a point after all.

Publication of *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* is a convenient occasion to affirm that they have substantially more than a point. Richard Freeland, in a sense, belongs to the third revisionist generation. Historians can no longer dismiss these critics as a present-minded radical band or (in a shrewder put-down) solemnly assert that they offer a useful counterpoise to more "balanced" and "realistic" interpretations. Unless these proliferating accounts are refuted in well-researched books (not sullen essays), Americans might just have to accept revisionism as the "truest" history currently available.

Freeland begins the latest contribution by examining the assumptions behind United States policy at the end of World War II. Having led the nation through a depression as well as four years of sacrifice on foreign battlefields, the Roosevelt administration wanted world peace and domestic prosperity.

Led by Cordell Hull, the President's advisers believed that economic nationalism, expressed in high tariffs and diminished trade, had led inexorably to the slump and then to armed conflict. Therefore, tariffs must be drastically reduced, and the remaining commercial barriers must apply equally to all countries. When freer trade linked the major powers, Hull proclaimed, living standards would rise, peoples would not become "deadly jealous" of one another, and there would be a "reasonable chance" for lasting peace. Furthermore, by opening the door to new markets for American products, the arrangement would prevent a renewed crisis at home.

Proponents of "multilateralism," as Freeland calls this plan for world order, recognized that success required the quick reconstruction of Europe. Until their economies recuperated from the war, most continental states would be likely prey for "totalitarianism," as well as unlikely customers for Kansas wheat or Pittsburgh steel. But European distress gave a decisive advantage to American planners. Depending on a regime's attitude toward multilateralism—or anything else—the United States could provide large-scale aid, offer token assistance, or refuse to finance recovery at all. When the British requested a \$6 billion loan, according to Asst. Secretary of State Will Clayton, the United States loaded the negotiations "with all the conditions that the traffic would bear."

The Soviet Union proved less tractable to the version of dollar diplomacy in the 1940s. Remembering two German invasions within a generation, Stalin wanted buffer states on his western frontier more than he wanted American capital. Deciding that the Russians meant to hold Eastern Europe—and probably to expand from there—Harry Truman conscripted the carrot-and-stick of multilateralism into the cold war. Truman and his coterie continued to think that prosperity demanded European reconstruction, and officials like Clayton still worked toward a cheerfully trading Wilsonian world. Yet after 1946 the administration stressed that economic aid was imperative in order to create a bulwark against leftist subversion and the Red Army.

According to Freeland, the strident emphasis on the Communist menace was

a strategic turn, not in Soviet-American relations but in Harry Truman's cold war with the 80th Congress. Multilateralism seemed to have as many enemies in the House and Senate as in the Kremlin; World War II had not cleansed Robert Taft and his allies of their skepticism about commitments abroad. Popular attitudes were scarcely more encouraging. Embracing a "sanitized internationalism," most Americans thought that cooperation with the Russians was possible and desirable; nor did they suppose that their own material welfare rested on European recovery. To win support for his internationalist program, Truman had—in Arthur Vandenberg's phrase—to "scare the hell out of the country." That, says Freeland, is precisely what he did.

Freeland pivots his analysis around the Truman Doctrine, that "seminal" declaration of cold-war foreign policy and the ideological basis for domestic anti-communism. Recommending assistance to Greece and Turkey in March 1947, the President charged that Communist-led terrorists threatened "the very existence of the Greek state"; he alluded ominously to "totalitarian" triumphs in Western Europe, and he predicted that most nations would soon have to choose between "alternate ways of life." The Greek Prime Minister had requested aid months earlier, but Truman portrayed a nation in sudden peril, whose collapse would affect free men everywhere.

While Congress considered the measure, the President's subordinates amplified his rhetoric of crisis. Because powerful Republicans feared subversives in the State Department more than guerrillas in Macedonia, the administration also embellished Truman's insinuation that an indivisible communism menaced America as well as Greece. Unable to avoid the internal security issue, Freeland says, the Democrats decided that they "might as well make the most of it." Nine days after propounding his doctrine, Truman established the Federal Employee Loyalty Program, a screening procedure "more stringent than [that] employed during the war itself." Atty. Gen. Tom Clark forged an "active alliance" between the Justice Department and the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Aptly symbolizing the battle against Communists at home and abroad, Clark lec-

tured Midwestern audiences on the value of Greco-Turkish aid.

In his famous Harvard address George Marshall stressed cooperation instead of containment, but Freeland shows that his offer to help any government "willing to assist in the task of reconstruction" meshed with the Truman Doctrine. Intended to restore "traditional commercial relationships," the Marshall Plan focused on Western Europe and emphasized short-term aid for food and fuel, features which "appear to have been designed to foreclose even the remote possibility" of Soviet participation. Estimated costs never included Russia or Eastern Europe. Moreover, when Congress threatened to reduce or delay the appropriation, the Democrats used the "same pattern of procedure" which had eased the way for aid to Greece and Turkey.

The State Department withheld passports from its detractors and summarily dismissed ten employees. The Defense Department denied press credentials to hostile newsmen. Compiling and publishing a roster of ninety-one suspect organizations, Tom Clark, in effect, enrolled "the whole country in a vast loyalty program." Although the Attorney General's list hardly insured national security, it effectively stigmatized groups which were, "among other subversive things, impeding [Truman's] efforts to win support for Cold War foreign policies." The attempt to stifle criticism was supplemented by a campaign to stir up national spirit. Freeland condemns the administration's crass appropriation of some of our "highest ethical ideas" to justify expansion abroad and to force consensus at home. His discussion of the Freedom Train, a railroad caravan bearing great documents from American history, is a marvelous portrait of patriotic *Kitsch*.

For a while the heads and tails of Truman's dollar diplomacy neatly complemented each other. The President could squeeze Communists from French and Italian cabinets by threatening to withdraw aid; he could squeeze aid from Congress by magnifying Communist influence in Europe. Yet, as Freeland demonstrates, the Democrats did not grasp the consequences of their "deliberate and highly organized" mobilization of our "venerable" anti-Communist tradition. First, the cold-war rhetoric obscured, even undermined, the quest for markets which had partly motivated the European Recovery Program; Congress hobbled grants with "increasingly serious restrictions on East-West trade." Second, Congressional conservatives—particularly partisans of Chiang Kai-shek—insisted on applying Truman's Doc-

trine to countries he preferred to ignore. Third, while wooing Republican Senators and discrediting dissidents, the administration provided a model for a more pervasive brand of intimidation. "The practices of McCarthyism were Truman's practices in cruder hands," Freeland says, "just as the language of McCarthyism was Truman's language, in less well-meaning voices."

Christopher Lasch and Athan Theoharis have previously charged liberals with sponsoring "McCarthyite" suppression before McCarthy. Contending that Truman pursued this strategy specifically in the attempt to pass internationalist legislation, Freeland adds an ingenious twist—as well as much new documentation—to the controversy. Partly because every student of contemporary history must make judgments before "all the facts are in," Freeland builds much of his case with circumstantial evidence and inferential argument. Consequently, in this account it is sometimes hard to tell when the Democrats are consciously distorting public attitudes, and when they are yielding to their own fears. It's also hard to tell how much they are conspiring to produce "what must inevitably seem a coherent pattern" of repression. The ambiguities are compounded by Freeland's propensity, perhaps inherited from his mentor Gabriel Kolko, to claim more in enthusiastic narrative passages than in the carefully written summations.

At the very least, however, we must accept Freeland's major thesis that the administration often deliberately exaggerated the Communist threat. Truman did not single-handedly create that popular obsession; he did do more than anyone else to legitimate it. We can also say that the promotion of orthodoxy at home was "fully consistent with the spirit and intention" of his foreign policy. And we can share Freeland's understated outrage. One needn't be a "purist about democratic processes," he says, to condemn the national debate which helped to mold relations with our allies and adversaries.

Freeland savors the irony in Truman's unsuccessful attempt to contain McCarthyism. Having sold his Doctrine too well, the President dared not recognize Communist China or permit its admission to the United Nations. Having "assiduously encouraged" concern about subversion, he could not effectively argue that domestic communism was impotent. Thus, following Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Formosa and Alger Hiss's indictment for perjury, Joseph McCarthy could arrange "a politically lethal marriage of the issues of Asia and internal security." Trapped by the escalating anti-Communist

rhetoric, Freeland says, the administration felt obliged to order troops above the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, and to supply the French in Indochina. If other revisionists endorse this persuasive interpretation, they may have to add a third unlikely hero to their duumvirate of Herbert Hoover and Robert Taft. Certainly Freeland's account of Truman's muddle could support Emmet John Hughes's decision, reached twenty years ago, that "only a Republican administration would have the *freedom*—the *chance*—to think anew and to act anew." Because the incumbent "architects of national policy were threatening to sound and act like prisoners of their critics," Hughes voted for Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952.

Of course the valuable suggestions and rich material in Freeland's book will be ignored by readers who refuse to re-evaluate the basic pattern—not merely the details—of our past. In a cranky and condescending piece in *The New York Times Book Review* (January 16), William V. Shannon maintained that this "pedestrian" effort by "a fledgling historian too young to remember the controversies he describes" renders "the mess of history considerably more neat and patterned than it actually was." Reminding us that he is old enough to recall the forties, Shannon charges Freeland with missing "the emotional and symbolic impact" of the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. Nine years after Hitler captured Prague, this comparable takeover "set alarm bells ringing."

Although the treatment of the Czech crisis is probably the most controversial section of *The Truman Doctrine*, Freeland's position is more nuanced than Shannon allows. He fully understands that American opinion was affected by visions of 1938-39. Indeed, recounting a "series of ominous disclosures, portentous interpretations, and somber warnings," he shows how the Democrats revived and focused those memories. Seeking, as James Forrestal put it, "to capitalize on the present concern" about European events, ranking officials explained that the blunt and brutal (though hardly unexpected) Soviet consolidation menaced American as well as Czech freedom. The coup in Prague set alarm bells ringing; once again, Harry Truman played the loudest carillon.

Shannon manages to be disagreeable in his disagreement. At one point he uses innuendo which would have done Harry Truman proud. Pouncing on a sloppy phrase—that Communists built "bridges to all segments of American liberal opinion"—he compares Freeland's language to the "unctuous and misleading terms" which fellow-travelers used in those far

off days." He forgets that even in those far-off days, when similar insinuations subdued fledgling dissenters, critics not known for unctuous terminology presented the indictments which Freeland now documents. Long before young scholars had asked their embarrassing questions, Bernard Baruch said that the Truman Doctrine was "tantamount to a declaration of . . . ideological or religious war." Walter Lippmann protested the attempt to "frighten" the Marshall Plan through Congress. In 1955, Murray Kempton complained that trials under the Smith Act "rested on a fantasy," with the script composed, "not by Joe Mc-

Carthy, but by Harry Truman and J. Edgar Hoover."

William Shannon's splenetic article illustrates a lesson which we fledgling historians know too well: it is almost impossible to convince a "survivor" that past events—especially controversial events—didn't happen precisely as he recalls. Those fledglings who hope that historical scholarship can sometimes be more instructive than nostalgia will want to investigate a corollary hypothesis also illustrated by Shannon's review: if cold-war liberals have such unreliable memories in 1972, perhaps their perceptions were just as cloudy in 1948. □

C. P. Snow: Nevertheless

THE MALCONTENTS. By C. P. Snow. Charles Scribner's Sons. 277 pp. \$6.95.

ROBERT K. MORRIS

Mr. Morris has written several books of criticism on British fiction, and frequently reviews contemporary literature.

C. P. Snow's first work of fiction since the completion of his eleven-volume *Strangers and Brothers* sequence is an ethical whodunit; most of its vitality comes from its being charged with relevance and morality.

To say it that baldly may seem to damn with faint praise. I do not mean to. By now Snow has been elevated from a phenomenon to an institution; as a novelist he has always been a rather special if annoying case. One dare not approach his work as one approaches, say, that of Iris Murdoch or William Golding or Doris Lessing or Anthony Powell—writers who have as many ideas as he has, but who have devoted themselves more to character and technique than to thesis. For with Snow thesis is all, qualitatively and quantitatively, generally transmitted at the expense of the other two elements, and yet honed with such maddening precision as to cut ultimately through most of his glaring novelistic deficiencies: the flat prose that in places becomes soporific; the wooden dialogue that sometimes attains to petrification; characterizations that are more like caricatures.

Nevertheless, one labors over Snow's labors because he is worth it. He is an important novelist because he is a straightforward and truthful one. He has never been experimental, and given his views on the novel he couldn't be. Since his first book, written in 1934, he has rejected the fiction inspired by myth and metaphysics, feeling that these obscure,

rather than clarify contemporary problems. Snow is pragmatic, didactic, scientific. His own blueprints for understanding the individual and the collectivity are dictated by hope, reason, probity, decency and good will; with these, on monolithic foundations of morality and conscience, he builds notions of government, politics, education, religion, science and history. His intelligence is fierce, his intellect formidable, his optimism perdurable. We hearken to what he says, even when we are unhappy with how he says it.

Like every Snow novel, *The Malcontents* is Snow crystallized, this time around two related questions of means and ends: is it ethical to do the wrong thing for the right reason; and, if so, may not the purest, most decent motives, blindly adhered to, destroy in the end more than they can redeem? The malcontents themselves are a group of young Cambridge radicals (called "the core") out to effect a "master-stroke against racialism." They plan to expose an influential Tory M.P. whom they have discovered to be the covert owner of an entire block of slum dwellings occupied by West Indians in the Midlands town that is the setting for the novel. All—WASP, Jew, Irish Catholic—are clever and dedicated and idealistic, though discontented about conditions in the world for different reasons:

Tess was concerned for sheer misery; Mark wanted people to be good; Neil was outraged by the helplessness of the poor; Stephen, who sometimes seemed the hardest and most skeptical, couldn't tolerate the sight of suffering. But though they were affected each in a different fashion, they were together about race. To them race, or rather the wiping away of race and its effects,

was as near a faith as any of them had, or as most people ever had. So far it was simple.

Less simple is what compounds the plot and elaborates the theme. For the core has bribed a landlord on the block (the wrong thing) to testify, when formal charges are brought, against his employer M. P., thereby blowing off the lid on his questionable holdings (the right thing). Except that the lid never blows. What does blow is the mind of a core member, who leaves a meeting via the 4th-story window after unwittingly drinking gin laced with LSD. The riddle of the death is wrapped in an enigma that has been formulated earlier: who among the group has been passing on its plans and movements to British intelligence? Snow whips up a good deal of tension in the unwinding of the various mysteries and dilemmas. Who is the informant? Who dropped the acid? Was the death a suicide? Will the authorities prosecute the group for conspiracy and traffic in dope? And what is likely to happen to the blotless escutcheon of the good families if and when the scandal breaks?

Answers do eventually come, and in the denouement revelations, too. But Snow's suspense is at best a shaky vehicle, circling, in its attempt to resolve questions of plot, the significant ethical questions. By contrast, in *The Masters* (one of the best of the *Strangers and Brothers* novels, dealing with power politics at Cambridge) the suspense is integral to the central theme, which affects the characters, individually and collectively. Because of choices to be made, chances to be taken, changes to be encountered, each man in *The Masters* is rendered different in the course of the story. A minor problem in *The Malcontents*, on the other hand, is the fact that sameness is all: at the beginning and at the end. Excepting the bright, serious, young physicist, Stephen Freer (whose surname itself suggests the quest he is about), the characters are seldom differentiated save by quick, broad strokes of Snow's stereotypewriter: the brilliant wastrel, Lance, interested in drugs and women; Bernard, the Marxian theorist from the Jewish working class; Neil, hating the Establishment because he couldn't attend Oxford and now dropping out of the red-brick university; Mark, the effete, dreamy patrician; and all their women (who seem little more than hangers-on).

I say minor problem because Snow is notorious for giving us surfaces. A more serious defect in *The Malcontents* is Snow's flogging these abstractions of character with paradoxes of ethics. They simply cannot take it. And since the

reader soon loses empathy for the characters, he is in danger of losing interest in the ethics. But Snow enjoys in this matter too a margin of safety that is a happy physical quantum; again and again he saves himself from tediousness because the contradictions of even these ironed-flat characters of his are large and universal. He asks, can their quest for "moral calm" be achieved by blindly sweeping away the calm of middle-aged liberals and humanitarians who have, persistently, worked for the same sort of "different world" as they are working for now? Is not youth's cry for freedom today something of a tautology, if not actually an evasion of a higher moral responsibility: self-discipline? And is not the credo (asserted by a sincere and hu-

manistic Stephen) that "the side one's on counts more than the steps one takes" the "justification"—as his equally sincere and humanistic father points out—"for a great deal of human wickedness"?

Of course Snow's malcontents are by no means wicked; none of his people is. And those who survive the muddle do so hopefully, even though hope itself is marred, being as much a matter of indeterminacy as of confidence. Still, in an age of anxiety and hopelessness there is much to be said for a thinker who continually holds out hope of any kind. Maybe Snow is looking at the world with blinders. Or maybe, hoping to catch a glimpse of man's "limitless expectations," he is really not looking at the world at all, but toward the stars. □

When Artists Go Beyond Art

THE DE-DEFINITION OF ART: Action Art to Pop to Earthworks. By Harold Rosenberg. Horizon Press. 256 pp. \$10.

SANFORD SCHWARTZ

Mr. Schwartz is a graduate student in art history at Columbia University.

There are critics who have a knack of making every artist they write about, whether he's Giotto or Andy Warhol, sound like the same one. Harold Rosenberg's case is more complicated. In his new collection (taken from reviews which appeared in *The New Yorker*), as in his earlier books, he uses the art scene to rewrite continually his own theory of modern art creation, which he calls Action art. The individual pieces in this collection are like chapters in a book: each one brings us back to what we think about his theory. Perceptive as he is, Rosenberg seems less a guide to the current situation than a landlord who's on the premises because he's checking up on his property.

Since in Harold Rosenberg's criticism words lead a life they don't have elsewhere, it's important to see what he means by them. "Action" in art, which he first wrote about in the early 1950s in connection with the Abstract Expressionists (or Action painters), he describes as a method of handling materials. "Action" means that the artist wants to go beyond "aesthetics" or "style." He wants to start from the beginning, where there are no styles; his pictures may be "Abstract" but they don't have to be. Whatever they look like, they express his own personality, his own "reality." An Action painting is a work of art, but it is also a personal statement, or vision, which

cannot be explained aesthetically. Rosenberg believes that Action in art is unique to our time. His insistence on the spiritual or "psychic" side of modern art is significant, if only because the majority of modern art critics write about it in formal or stylistic terms. More important, though, is the fact that his ability to write convincingly about the visions and goals of the Abstract Expressionists helped a larger audience to take this difficult art seriously.

There are pieces on individual Action painters (Barnett Newman, Mark Rothko, Philip Guston) in *The De-Definition of Art*, and reviews of important museum exhibitions, like the Metropolitan's "New York School" event and the Museum of Modern Art's Stein Family show. But the most engaging essays are about art movements like Pop art, Minimal sculpture, Happenings, art *povera*, kinetic art and light art, Earthworks and environments—movements dedicated to extending our idea of art so far that a scratched-up part of the desert is art, Brillo is art, self-destroying machines are art, and even walking around and mumbling to yourself is art. Couldn't these movements represent a new version of Action art? That is the very question that each of these cases presents to Rosenberg. They seem to have, as he would say, aims "much broader than style." Certainly, like Surrealism and Action painting, they introduce all sorts of non-art materials and experiences into art; Conceptualists think it enough if they simply jot down their intentions, whether for a planned sculpture or a planned rearrangement of the living room. Back

in the 1950s, Robert Rauschenberg made a picture with a live tree in it; the work wasn't complete until he went to the gallery every day and watered it. This little demonstration of how to mix art and life was basically an ironic, Dada-style bit of fooling around. But things have changed. Now, dirt is delivered straight-faced to the gallery (where it's just dumped, not arranged); or, better yet, a photograph of it is sent. The very idea of an "Earthwork" shows a revolt against the art gallery-collector syndrome (but many collectors are undaunted by it: as Rosenberg wittily remarks, "Robert Scull, early Pop patron, has acquired an art-marred parcel of real estate in Nevada").

The recent developments range from ironic jokes (Pop art) to belligerent acts against the whole idea of timeless, museum-protected art (Happenings, Conceptualist "proposals" for works never done, Earthworks, etc.). Rosenberg shows how these styles reflect what he feels is the basically "anti-aesthetic" attitude of modern artists—the attitude that making art objects is a purposeless way for a man to spend his life. No other critic, adversary or partisan, has discussed these styles so penetratingly in these terms. But except for the Pop artist Claes Oldenburg (whose spirit and style of living remind him of the Abstract Expressionists), his real sympathies are not with

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these trends. For Rosenberg they have little connection with the personal, "psychic" statement he associates with Action art. He's not explicit about it, but you feel that he misses the element of poetry, or anguish, or spiritual quest that went into so many Abstract Expressionist careers, from Gorky and Pollock to Rothko and Newman. Although he can take the *idea* of an Earthwork seriously, his urge is to show its unseriousness. He interprets art *povera* and the rest as a "reaction against and a continuation of the trend toward formalistic over-refinement in the art of the sixties"—which means that no matter how deliberately "unartistic" a pile of dirt (an Earthwork) or a blown-up cartoon (a Lichtenstein) may be, they could only exist in a highly self-conscious art world, ready to look at everything aesthetically. He shows how these new "anti-art" forms have simply made a new kind of artist—the artist-showman, who stages Happenings or carves up Utah.

Rosenberg's reading of these "anti-art" trends as basically art-derived is, I believe, perceptive (though he's not the only critic who has done so). But if he is going to explain away Conceptual art, Pop art and Earthworks as mere "reactions" to other art world trends, the natural question is, "Why can't Action art be judged in the same way?" Rosenberg writes as if the Action artists were somehow apart from the art world: their art came out of themselves (while an Earthworker's art presumably comes out of what he reads in the art magazines). Rosenberg has always maintained that the Action artists began by clearing the air of any "aesthetic" notions; that is an essential part of his theory of Action art; that is what he means when he says, "What the American artist sought was not a better or newer fiction but reality." But looking at a typical Action painting by Barnett Newman (a large blue field with a white stripe running down the middle), it's certainly hard for the spectator to know that the work doesn't have anything to do with aesthetic qualities (the "newer fiction" part) and everything to do with the "reality" and "life" of the artist. I believe we can judge this picture—for what it tells us about reality and fiction—in the same way we'd judge a portrait by Van Gogh, a Minimal box sculpture by Don Judd, or an interior by Vermeer. Yet Rosenberg is fiercely opposed to an Abstract Expressionist picture being looked at in this way, as another art work on the museum wall. For him the museum idea is like an embalming: by making the work "immortal" it changes an artist's passionate act, or statement, into an edifying, tasteful, pure masterwork to be

"appreciated" by all. It's easy to agree with him here—the museum experience very often *does* kill art for us, but the museum atmosphere can ruin a non-Action work as easily as an Action one.

His relation to these pictures is like a father unwilling to let his children out into the world: he wants us to believe that the intentions and aspirations of the Action painters are the only things their pictures are "about." It's for this reason that he never says whether individual works are "good Rothkos" or "bad." For him, "quality" is meaningless compared to the struggle to find the action (Pollock's drip) or the sign (Newman's stripe) that expresses the painter's self. But Rosenberg's stress on the idea or intention of the Action artist, instead of on the finished painting, makes these pictures more like a Conceptual work of the 1960s than he might think. After all, if we can read what Rothko's idea was, why do we have to look at his pictures?

Reading Rosenberg's objections to the rhetoric of 1960s' styles, I couldn't help think that the same things could be said about his own theorizing. If the formalist painter Frank Stella's titles such as "Conway I" and "Chocorua I" are "embarrassingly 'poetic'" to him, shouldn't that be our reaction to Barnett Newman titles like "Genetic Moment," "Chartres," "Abraham" and "Onement I"? He cuts down art *povera* by saying that, to be meaningful in the broadest sense, it must eventuate in political action. But he has a different standard for Action art, because he says that Jackson Pollock's "contact" with oil and canvas is a "mythic act," momentous enough to be culturally remarkable. He complains

that recent art is not spoken of in a literary way, that it can't be described as a metaphor of experience; instead, he says, "the place of literature has been taken by the rhetoric of abstract concepts." His own writings about the Action painters are certainly full of literary metaphors, with their continual references to ritual magic, dramas of purgation, and rites of self-understanding. (His language often makes the subject seem more like a rabbi than a painter.) But Rosenberg doesn't appear to recognize that his use of words like reality, action and style—no matter how literary they are—makes them too into a "rhetoric of abstract concepts."

Rosenberg sometimes seems caught in his own theorizing—his writing on art before the Abstract Expressionists makes it appear as if he can see art only in terms of Action painting. Yet frequently this approach can be extremely provocative, as in his interpretation of Gertrude Stein's ideas in *Picasso* as a precursor to Minimalism. Or his reading of Klee as a kind of theoretic Action artist—an unexpected interpretation (it's in his *Artworks and Packages*) which forces us to rethink our verdict on Klee. Rosenberg's special concern with the areas where art and life mix makes him a shrewd critic of Dubuffet's seemingly inexhaustible energies in exploiting this terrain. And it's this concern which makes him such a profound commentator on recent "anti-art" styles. For no matter how "unsympathetic" he may be, Rosenberg is instinctively engaged when artists seem to go, as he would put it, "beyond art." For him, this is always the key issue of modernism. It's likely that his writings on "anti-art" will tell future generations what these movements were after. □

Playboys of the Western World

HOW MANY MILES TO CAMELOT?: The All-American Sport Myth. By Jerry Izenberg. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 227 pp. \$6.95.

MURRAY POLNER

Mr. Polner is the author of *No Victory Parades: The Return of the Vietnam Veteran* (Holt, Rinehart & Winston) and *When Can I Come Home: A Debate on Amnesty* (Doubleday/Anchor).

This book by the sports columnist of the *Newark Star-Ledger* is a slashing, iconoclastic, often funny, very personal attack on those he believes have perverted American athletics. The "All-American Sport Myth" he refers to in his title is the notion that spectator sports, professional and amateur, are simply games,

that competition breeds inner discipline and courage, and that somehow Knute Rockne, Vince Lombardi, Billy Graham and Richard Nixon are one and the same. The corollary of this is the ultimate obscenity: Melvin Laird has disclosed that the mining of North Vietnam's harbors and the intensified bombing of its territory have been named Operation Linebacker. Coach Laird also explained away the failure of Vietnamization with the observation that the ARVN are "sort of an expansion club."

To this kind of indictment, Izenberg adds another. Corporate hustlers, their eyes on closed-circuit TV and other such gimmicks, have taken over. They are carpetbaggers with "law degrees and business school backgrounds, money changers who destroy anything decent

or honest about the nature of competitive sports in this country. Make no mistake about it, they have won."

But have they really? While the sharp-eyes are certainly out there grabbing for quick profits, they are now coming under increased pressure to share the wealth, most particularly with their hired help. Even coaches have felt the effects of petulance, arrogance and back talk on the part of players—what in other circles is referred to as the insistence that athletes too have rights. It is very hard for the professional jocks who run the sports business to deal with this kind of resistance. The price keeps rising among supposed amateurs in the colleges, and in the professional ranks the coming of employee-labor negotiations and actual strikes—let alone long hair, beards and black demands for parity—have unsettled what was once a promoter's paradise. Like weak men called upon to govern wisely during times of crisis, too many of them have responded by ordering that sideburns go up and beards come off, and insisting that athletes do not want really to strike but are forced into it by outside agitators and moreover there is too little reverence for America among the young.

The best chapter in the book, "Look What They Done to Sweet Baby Jesus," details the myopia and plain bigotry that led to the exclusion of Muhammad Ali from the boxing ring. The tawdry promoters (who, Izenberg reminds us, have never provided pensions for their fighters), the political eunuchs who run state boxing commissions and the World Boxing Association, whatever that is, all lined up together with the forces of righteousness to deny Ali his right to earn a living. The New York State Boxing Commission "stripped Ali of his title before he was even indicted by the government. It refused him a license while his case was on appeal. I don't pretend to understand such men. I don't think even Sigmund Freud could." Pity the poor fan who only craves a good show.

The past few years have seen a new challenge to the myth, this time from the Left. Overdrawn and often exaggerated, the charges coming from that quarter are based on the assumption that organized sport is the symbol of a nation whose values are bankrupt, and in itself a means of inducing conformity. But the trouble with this critique is that not only does it raise more questions than it can answer but it is bound to get nowhere because spectator sports are not the province of anyone's isms, and in the nature of the case cannot be manipulated to advance this or that ideology. Spectator sports are big business. With

that realization, everything follows: Scandals are endemic. Racism, drugs and TV exploitation are familiar features. But these realities are not to be confounded with the phenomenon of line-backers turned hippies—nor with frustrated third-stringers in the White House. It is show biz, of no more moment than the last three musicals on the Broadway stage. It is a series of circuses heightened by artificial city-state rivalries and by sports writers whose prose too often reads like club handouts. It is essentially the best and most innocent diversion for millions of us, which is to say that until the critics come up with something better, we prefer our Sunday TV violence.

Izenberg catches the real truth of what

athletics is about. The beauty of sports has to do with leaping shortstops, with impossible backhands, with defensive backs matching receivers step for step—the personification of the "artistry and the competitiveness and the poetry of what two professionals can achieve in a *mano a mano* confrontation." But enough. The sports writers, at least the more sensitive and acute ones like Jerry Izenberg, have given us their versions, perhaps to counter the decades of bland and lifeless books by the myth makers. Still, when will we hear from the athletes themselves? Even *Ball Four* was written in collaboration with a professional writer. Is there a real writer out there among the hockey sticks, the bats and the shoulder pads? □

God Protect Us from Our Friends

THE POLITICS OF LITERATURE: Dissenting Essays on the Teaching of English. Edited by Louis Kampf and Paul Lauter. Pantheon Books. 429 pp. \$10.

GEORGE MAYBERRY

Mr. Mayberry is professor of English and coordinator of American studies at Point Park College, Pittsburgh.

It is easy to point out the inadequacies, inconsistencies, oversimplifications, omissions, obscurantism, bad faith, even errors of this most recent "antitextbook" that stems from a New University Conference group and the tumultuous 1968 Modern Language Association meeting:

Item: A "College English teacher . . . hears the regents' mandate that academic freedom extends only to the legitimate and prescribed subject matter of the course." Even where the mandates exist they are honored mainly in the breach.

Item: "Our major concern [is] the specific effects of literature. For this, our movement has few precedents, though William Empson and Kenneth Burke—both on the periphery of academic respectability—gave us useful, but often obscure, hints." Is it ignorance or sectarian malice that ignores Parrington, Matthiessen, T. K. Whipple, Wilson, Cowley, LeRoi Jones, Harry Levin, Ellison and Baldwin, Irving Howe or, to come down to the cruder level of much of the volume, Upton Sinclair, Mike Gold, Granville Hicks, A. B. Magil, V. J. Jerome, Samuel Sillen, E. B. Burgum and the early Phillips and Rahv—to mention only native leftist critics?

Item: The introduction stresses that two of the thirteen contributors "cannot

currently obtain teaching work; another is under suspension and facing academic trial." But the notes on the contributors reveal that one is a past and another present president of MLA; one has been editor of *College English*, another is editor of *Victorian Studies*; one has been acting provost of a university and another is currently a department head; eight hold professorial rank.

Item: I don't know what "American studies programs" the editors refer to in which "the religious ideas [of Puritanism] studied were lifted from the social and political contexts in which they arose." All the teachers I know in this field would acquaint students with Tawney at the least, and most likely with Perry Miller and Richard Schlatter. None of these names—and two belong to radicals—appears in this scholarly volume. *An aside:* I wonder if the contributors named Delany and O'Neil would agree with this descendant of Irish peasants that it is cold comfort that Cromwell was (hurrah) a revolutionary.

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Item: Generalization and easy logic cum radical cliché. "The apology of liberal ideology is that literature 'enriches' one's life. But this explanation turns literature into an adornment, an isolable unit that confirms the sterility of life under capitalism." (Ellen Cantarow.)

"New Criticism, which emerged in the 1930's to halt the advance of proletarian culture, gained complete ascendancy in the early 1950's as part of the triumph of anticommunist ideology." "Herman Melville was a consciously proletarian writer. He wrote about the life of working people on ships and in factories and offices." "... *Moby Dick*, the great philosophical romance whose highest achievement is demolishing the bourgeois mind-body dichotomy from a sailor's point of view." (Not Mike Gold or the author of the *Dick* and *Jane* readers but Bruce Franklin, a professor of English at Stanford University.)

Item: Although the editors are fleetingly aware of the role of factionalism in the history of radicalism, the narrowness and inflexibility of most of the contributors is incompatible with "creating a humane and socialist society." Richard Ohmann, who proves that you don't have to be a boor or a bore to be a radical, refers to the New Critics as "sensitive and well-intentioned men, whose main effect on the academy was for the better. I do not hold them to blame for the present crisis of confidence in academic literary culture, much less for the viciousness of American culture at large," but the majority of the contributors describe the New Criticism in Franklin's terms and, like him, indulge in personal attacks on practically everyone who doesn't share their ultraisms. This last word is plural because several varieties of Marxism are represented, the least rigid the socialism of Dubcek.

Item: As some hyphenated American said in effect, if we do not study our history we are condemned to repeat it. Our editors repeat without acknowledgment the old pleas of Debs, DeLeon and Broun—who do not appear in the index—for "worker's control . . . of the [publishing] industry"; failing that, they have permitted one of the largest "established institutions"—in a prophetic nightmare of Cantarow—to produce "the next swinging teaching manual of the Good Society, ten-dollar edition."

But enough. I have dwelt at length on these excrescences only because I hope that everyone concerned with literature will read this book. I'm afraid that informed and sensitive readers thumbing through this overpriced collection of proletcult and hitting only these clinkers might forgo further examination of the

F.S.

*Because of the snow,
because I have just changed journeys
like an eye changing position
everything is different.
I have learned many things,
to be cold without falling.
There were no clues,
just snow,
just you being,
like distant stars,
visible and somewhere else.*

Catherine Stetson

volume. And while the contributors to *The Politics of Literature* are frequently as limited, careerist, reductive, joyless and juiceless as their tight-assed liberal-conservative contemporaries who effectively conduct the teaching and study of beautiful letters in the American academic republic—a republic only at best; and never, forbid, a democracy—"The artist or intellectual [and a good teacher is something of both] who does not have a revolutionary attitude toward life but who is an honest person" will find much in this book of interest and value. I found the quotation from Fidel Castro in the previous sentence in an essay by Sheila Delany, one of several in which a young teaching scholar with "left political convictions" wrestles with "the monuments of a culture many of whose values you reject." That is also one of the stresses of the editors' introduction, of Ellen Cantarow's autobiographical account of her conventional mis-education at Wellesley and Harvard and her less than happy teaching career (she was jobless when the book went to press), Ohmann's mordant but accurate account of the study and teaching of English since 1948—the year he entered college—and Lillian S. Robinson's excellent reading of Virginia Woolf's feminist propaganda (yes, propaganda) which examines without rending that shimmering prose.

Other essays seek a counter-canon, new approaches or both. The editors offer prospectuses for "Revolutionary Literature," "Imperialism" and "The Anti-Slavery Struggle"—all containing many books that have been used as a matter of course by nonaligned professionals for some time. The first course was taught by Lauter at the University of Maryland, from which he was fired, "allegedly for 'subversion of the grading system.'" Florence Howe reports on teaching poetry in Baltimore public high schools over several years beginning in 1968, a heartening experience in spite of obstacles for the teachers and the taught, who, as in any good learning experience, had

much to teach the teachers. William Labov in "The Logic of Nonstandard English" and Wayne O'Neil in "The Politics of Bidialectalism" explore and defend the use of black English and rightly condemn the educational system that has used the ideal of standard English to insure the *status quo*. But it is interesting, however, that even after changing his name, LeRoi Jones spoke recently at Gary in the basically, if brotherly modulated, standard English of his nondramatic writing and that of Wright, Ellison, Baldwin, Bullins and the late George Jackson to whom this volume is dedicated. This could suggest that what might be desirable in the social and economic area may bear no easy relation to the realm of literature, something which in fact Marx does suggest in the *Critique of Political Economy*.

Again I recommend this book and hope that the unemployed contributors are back teaching to bolster a healthy pluralist culture, the surest hope that a future Socialist society would be in truth humane. □

DANCE

NANCY GOLDNER

The Alvin Ailey American Dance Theatre is enjoying huge box-office success. The City Center, which sponsored Ailey's recent season, April 18-30, reports that the company set an all-time high in pre-season sales. That is astonishing, considering that the theatre has been in business for a long time, has booked such a wide variety of attractions, and that the Ailey group does modern dance. Usually such successes are one-season affairs, when a choreographer is "discovered." Paul Taylor created a ticket flurry during the Christmas season six or seven years ago, and Merce Cunningham did the same in 1968. Now Cunningham is doing business as usual, while Taylor has not even appeared in New York this year, except for a lecture-demonstration. Ailey, however, has been doing well for the last two years. How does one account for this popularity in an art form for which public support is uncertain?

The answer ought to be that Ailey is a great choreographer, but he is a bad choreographer, if the usual standards are applied. His works are neither musical nor well constructed; indeed, many of them are unconstructed. He has no feel and perhaps no concern for lyricism. His themes are without metaphorical reverberations; in this sense, his ballets are not moving. Most important, he is

not inventive. His dance vocabulary is so limited that one can predict what the dancers will do next. He adores arm movement, which is not only overused but intrinsically inane and corny, with its long, agonized stretches, reaching-out poses and merely decorative, at times fussy, flourishes in the wrists, elbows and shoulders. The amazing thing is that Ailey can keep turning out ballets. They look the same, but they do not bear the marks of a man pressured to create continually without the tools. One might surmise that he is content to produce the same spiritual, "arm ballet" again and again, were he not also playing with so-called abstract ballets and with ideas that involve the whole body moving at full capacity. Yet these dances, like *Choral Dances*, *Myth* and the new *The Lark Ascending*, are academic and anemic by comparison with Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey and Lester Horton—and comparison is appropriate and inevitable. They are what might be termed classical modern dances, except that Ailey's classicism is imitative rather than in the quintessential spirit of its predecessors.

Artistically, there is nothing to cheer. But the fact is that in this case concerns about choreography and even dancing are beside the point. What one responds to, legitimately, in the dancers are stage presence, beautiful bodies and generous spirits—not technique. Although not memorable in themselves, the ballets strike up a remarkably warm and immediate relationship with the audience. The first thing one notices about that audience is its youthfulness. Many come in bunches, in casual mood and dress. Possibly the same crew went to a movie or rock concert the night before. A relatively large number of them are black. Ailey too is black, as are most of his dancers. His most characteristic and popular works are set to blues—in *Mary Lou's Mass*, to Mary Lou Williams' bluesy jazz score, and they have the blues's rambling, warm and emotionally direct qualities. They are, first of all, ballets by a black man, for

black people. That defines the company and triggers the feelings of rapport, which are then picked up by white people in the joy that comes from participating in a recognizable and common language, even if it is not one's native tongue. Humor is one touchstone. In *Mary Lou's Mass*, the parable of the beggar Lazarus who is scorned by the rich man and then gets the delicious satisfaction of revenge, once he is in Abraham's bosom, is told with an equally delicious, exaggerated simplicity and Biblical familiarity typical of black religiosity. The blacks get it, the whites recognize it, and in the end everyone loves it. This same ricocheting and intensification of response happens when the action gets sexy, as in Ailey's *Revelations* and *Blues Suite* or Donald McKayle's *Rainbow 'Round My Shoulder*, revived this season. The encounters are extremely frank and provocative and at the same time kidding, teasing. The man eyes the rolling hips, knows he's done for, and relishes the thought of his undoing. It is a particularly black vision of sex, up-front, self-conscious and mocking. Being so attitudinal, it strikes with incredible directness at the audience.

The blackness of the company's signature is not the only thing that gets the ball rolling. Ailey's dancers have soul that transcends color lines. They exude a sincerity and energy that sweep the audience into their wake. Having no intricate choreography to contend with—no fast footwork, balances in off-balance positions, or other virtuoso cares—they can put all their strength, mental and physical, into expressing energy itself, or the pure physicality of dancing. They do not evoke the ecstasy that Isadora Duncan talked about, for that was moral as well as physical, but the Ailey dancers do excite. The essence of this crude but powerful style is best seen in two solos that Ailey recently created for his two stars, Dudley Williams and Judith Jamison. The lines are sweeping, big, uncomplicated. Mostly, the dancers throw their arms outward and upward, their necks and torsos pulled along in the momentum created by their arms. Crescendo follows crescendo as the dancer spins into a deep arabesque, falls to the floor, throws an arm out, breathes deeply. Jamison's solo is called *Cry*, but every Ailey gesture seems to be a cry. One can forget that the dancers are dancing; they're just moving—with feeling. The illusion is thus created that anyone with enough of this "feeling" and lung power could approximate them. All of us are potential dancers, Ailey invites us to believe. The idea becomes irresistible and perhaps explains the tremendous sympathy and connection between audience and stage.

At the end of these exercises in blood and guts, the dancers line up for curtain calls. Most of them are exceptionally good-looking, while the tall Miss Jamison is no less than a phenomenon of bone structure. Their skin glistens with sweat. Their smiles of gratitude for the clapping are as straightforward as their dancing has been. It is impossible not to like them and very possible to love them, especially for people who can abandon themselves to the experience because they are not interested in choreography, or for those who choose to let choreography go hang for an evening.

I am always tempted, but ultimately unable to swing with Ailey, for that would involve a conscious effort to vacation. Yet the general audience reaction is genuine, and the Ailey success story might be one of the few examples of real, popular culture, in which audience and performers find each other on their own, without the aid of the professional vendors of culture. In the arts—most recently in dance, because it has just now joined the big time—critics and audience join in a complicated manipulative process which promulgates an opinion whose origin is obscure and not readily traceable to present reality, but is nonetheless omnipresent. It is just there, in the air, and the job of the audience and critics

VISITING FRIENDS ABROAD

on this island
a clock strikes the hours
my daughter stops her play
to listen

years from now
a clock will strike
and she will wonder
what that
is

Barbara Hughes

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is to keep it there. The longer the image remains, the more powerful it becomes, until it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The acclaim that greets the Ailey company, however, is spontaneous and inspired by the moment. One might say the audience lacks sophistication. It does, which is too bad. But they do like Ailey for real—if not for what I think the most important reasons. Furthermore, they are impervious to the implications of sophistication, and that is their strength, for it is sophistication, or taste, that makes audiences nervous and vulnerable to the machinations of the taste makers. □

RECORDS

DAVID HAMILTON

SCHOENBERG, BERG, WEBERN: Music for String Quartet. Margaret Price, soprano; La Salle String Quartet. Deutsche Grammophon 2720-029. \$34.90 (5 discs and book).

Most importantly because it incorporates the first adequate recordings of the Schoenberg string quartets since the (still noteworthy) Juilliard versions of two decades ago, this omnibus package is a major contribution to the literature. From the Brahms-Dvorák orbit of the posthumously published 1897 Quartet in

D major (this a first-ever recording), the densely concentrated chromaticism of Quartet No. 1 (1905), the breakthrough to indeterminate tonality in the vocal movements of No. 2 (1908), to the "classical" twelve-tone discipline of the final two works (1927, 1936), it outlines one of the major trajectories of 20th-century music. The final step of this path, in the String Trio of 1946, where the obsession with maintaining certain formalisms of the Viennese classical tradition gives way to an acceptance of the new technique's structural implications, is missing here, but there is a fine recent version by the Juilliard (in Columbia M2S-767).

For dogmatists, the last two quartets are necessarily unsatisfactory because they attempt to wed the twelve-tone technique with the forms and procedures of thematic working-out that Schoenberg inherited from (and revered in) Mozart, Haydn, Beethoven and Brahms: the row manipulations impose continuous use of the entire field of twelve available pitches, a rigorous short-range rotation inimical to the directionality of the classical procedures, which depend upon the more or less exclusive use of a particular selection of pitches, with a well-defined hierarchy among the various selections used during a work.

That the dogmatists are historically correct—for Schoenberg's particular path has not been found attractive by many successors—need not, however, rob the works themselves of a place in the literature; on the contrary, they stand among the most fascinating monuments of the century. The massive effort to construct a simulacrum of the tradition, to generate within the new harmonic field equivalent or substitute tensions and connections, gives these quartets (and other Schoenberg pieces of the same period) an uncommon aesthetic stress, which should be valued for itself, however unsatisfactory the underlying premises may seem from the historical and intellectual standpoints.

Webern, of course, made no such attempt to reconcile the 19th and 20th centuries, and indeed his "traditionalist" 1905 quartet, included here, suggests that his musico-intellectual responses were not fundamentally engaged by the heritage that so fascinated Schoenberg. If Webern's choice—ignoring the immediate classic-romantic past and meeting the present rather on terms suggested by still earlier traditions—proved the generative force for more recent developments, we can yet recognize the enormous limitation he simultaneously accepted, especially in the context offered

by the present collection; while admiring the perfection of Webern's achievement, one can well imagine that Schoenberg may have felt the emotional range of his tradition too precious to sacrifice for the security that Webern found within a narrower range. Unable to be either hedgehog (Webern) or fox (Berg), the eldest composer of these three remains the most enigmatic and compelling.

In addition to the well-recorded, structurally secure performances (occasionally but not significantly marred by suspect intonation), the album contains a valuable book that assembles letters, essays and analyses by the three composers relating to the music. Altogether, an indispensable set.

HAYDN: Symphonies 73-81. Philharmonia Hungarica; Antal Dorati, cond. London STS-15182/5. \$11.92 (4 discs).

The fourth installment of a monumental undertaking, a complete recording of the Haydn symphonies, surprisingly well executed and offered at an irresistible price. The *fable convenu*—or, at least, accepted by too many orchestral program makers—that Haydn's "mature" work begins with Symphony No. 88, breaks down immediately upon hearing any of these elegant and imaginative scores. (Earlier volumes in the series contain Symphonies 49-72, and are equally fascinating.) Nothing short of a book would suffice to explore this literature fully in words; I will have to be content with saying that the record industry has not in years offered a comparable pleasure of discovery.

Some significant reissues:

BACH: Inventions. Wanda Landowska, harpsichord. RCA Victor VIC-1634. \$2.98 (mono; recorded c. 1958).

BEETHOVEN: Violin Concerto. Fritz Kreisler, violin; Berlin State Opera Orchestra. Leo Blech, cond. EMI/Dacapo C-047-01243. \$5.98 (mono; recorded 1926).

BRAHMS: Violin Concerto. Yehudi Menuhin, violin; Lucerne Festival Orchestra; Wilhelm Furtwängler, cond. EMI/Pathe C-053-01239. \$5.98 (mono; recorded 1949).

WAGNER: *Die Walküre*, Act I. Lotte Lehmann, soprano; Lauritz Melchior, tenor; Emanuel List, bass; Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra; Bruno Walter, cond. Seraphim 60190. \$2.98 (mono; recorded 1935).

RECITAL: Operatic arias. Bidú Sayão, soprano; various orchestras. Odyssey Y-31151. \$2.98 (mono; recorded 1941-47). □

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
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Crossword Puzzle No. 1444

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

- 1 A bunch of doctors operated on your old everlasting combination! (11)
- 9 and 16 down Become fractious, as one might in destroying the evidence. (4,4,3,6)
- 10 Retry a channel? (6)
- 11 Against the type of 8 that 18 was? (7)
- 12 Like N.Y.'s vista, in a way. (7)
- 14 A lass in trouble, but certainly not the fast type. (6)
- 15 One of the first astronauts might be confused around the stretch. (8)
- 17 A baby doesn't get in the continent with a rather fanciful arrangement. (8)
- 20 Being fat, she is rather awkward to flutter around. (6)
- 22 Bees can change, just by not being there. (7)
- 24 What one would pay for the loan of a worthless animal now in vogue? (7)
- 26 One could hardly expect such a procession to end without some hitch. (6)
- 27 8 takes a boat with his first mate, perhaps. (8)
- 28 A bad poet, to girls who should appreciate rock. (11)

DOWN

- 2 Workers from 8 to 4, or 4 to 12 should substitute, perhaps. (9)
- 3 Has a certain respect for such as Paul? (7)
- 4 She lived in a doll's house. (4)

- 5 It's old-fashioned to listen, especially to listen and understand. (7)
- 6 A possibly important day for a person in South Africa. (5)
- 7 In the main, no advanced civilization. (6)
- 8 and 18 down Somewhat dated frock coat. (6,6)
- 13 Appeals, or possibly the end of appeals. (5)
- 16 See 9 across
- 18 See 8 down
- 19 Found as worldly, but not quite as cruel. (7)
- 20 Ornamentation akin to piping? (7)
- 21 The son of Abraham, in short, as they say? (6)
- 23 Invest, as the issue does. (5)
- 25 Give a ring to a friend, with a stone in it, obviously. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1443

ACROSS: 1, 10, 9, 15 and 27 Get up on the wrong side of the bed; 11 Alive; 12 Amends; 16 At-homes; 17, 5, 20 and 30 Sing a song of sixpence; 19 User; 22 and 31 Downfall; 23 Exit; 25 Disavow; 29 Napped; 33 Ariel; 35 Dingo; 36 Natural; 37 Tenders. DOWN: 1 Gewgaws; 2 Trove; 3 Pagoda; 4 Note; 5 Axes; 6 Oxalis; 7 Glide; 8 and 34 Free-for-all; 13 Steroid; 14 Coastal; 15 Sea lion; 18 and 25 New Dealer; 22 Detrain; 24 Tedious; 26 Warden; 28 Exist; 32 Flat.

Readers are invited to send for a free copy of Mr. Lewis' "ground rules." Address Puzzle Department, *The Nation*, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014.

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
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